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ABSTRACT 
The goal of this thesis is, first and foremost, the presentation of the stance of allegorical 
interpretation and its potential revaluation in a postmodern context (as argued for by 
Hans Georg Gadamer), giving special consideration to select pre-critical voices and 
allegorical methodologies that are becoming relevant to this discussion concerning 
personal, revelatory Truth or Truths. This goal is enriched by the incorporation of 
pertinent, contemporary (postmodern) perspectives in literary theory that concern the 
relationship between the world of a text, the world of the individual or society in which 
that text is interpreted, and any possible or useful allegorical link between the two. 
Secondarily (and finally), given Gadamer’s unique view of Truth and its postmodern 
relation to pre-critical thought, I ultimately offer the hermeneutical methodology of the 
Antebellum African American Church (as constructed and articulated by Dwight 
Hopkins) as an acceptable and appropriate model for interpretive mimesis for those 
reading communally relevant texts as sources of positive social change and as sources 
leading to the revelation of personal Truths that disclose the measures, methods, and 
meanings of being human beings with infinitely complicated contexts. 
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1. Introduction 
This essay’s primary intention is to examine the relationship between a community and 
the text or texts that it interprets together and the implications that this relationship implies. 
Secondarily, this essay’s intention is to explore the interpretive tool of allegory as it is explained 
by Hans Georg Gadamer and compare his notion to historical examples of allegorical 
interpretation, arguing that his call for a rehabilitation of allegory in a contemporary 
horizon/World would look (at least methodologically) something like the historical examples of 
allegorical interpretation that I offer in the body of the essay.  
I will begin my argument with an introduction to allegory in general and (much more 
importantly) the idea of allegory as it is articulated by Gadamer in Truth and Method. My 
discussion of this interpretive tool will be framed within Gadamer’s larger discussion of 
interpretation, semiotics, art, and history within the humanistic disciplines, and I will attempt to 
give a thorough account of his thought on the subjects and their relationship to allegory as it is 
presented as a philosophical tool. Beyond this, I will give ample consideration to Gadamer’s very 
distinct view of Truth and how it is actively acquired (especially as his view stands in 
relationship to more passive views on how Truth is acquired), since this will be central to the rest 
of my essay. Following this, I will explore how Gadamer sees the idea of kerygma (fundamental 
to his understanding of Christianity and Christian biblical interpretation) as related to allegory, 
not as identical by any stretch of the imagination, but as a procession from one to the other: 
kerygma, being a personal call rather than an acceptance of abstract principles, is achieved 
through allegorical interpretation that makes concrete and personal understandings out of 
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abstract textual ideas possible. Finally, I will discuss how this all operates within the individual 
(and sometimes communal) level, though it can have social effect. 
Building from my discussion of Gadamer and his idea of allegory, I will offer my first of 
two historical examples of allegorical interpretation: Origen of Alexandria’s. Focusing first on 
the Stoic allegoresis that preceded Origen, I will then turn my attention to Origen’s methodology 
in his use of allegory in biblical interpretation and his purpose in using it, ultimately making the 
observation that Origen’s allegory seeks to make the words of the Bible, though of an entirely 
different horizon and social World, speak to the people of a congregation in their situations as 
persons. I will be focusing on his allegorical methodology and his allegorical purpose, arguing 
that Origen is employing allegory in transforming abstract textual notions and ideas that may be 
foreign to his audience into concrete, personal, and important ideas that make sense within the 
congregation’s contexts. In this sense, allegory is the philosophical tool that bridges the 
interpretive chasm from text to actual world of experience, but in doing so, not only does it 
produce an “effect” when understood, it always transforms the abstract into concrete, the 
disconnected into the personal, the unit of text into theological kerygma; a portion of my purpose 
in showing this transaction will be to argue for the relevance of this kind of allegory today, 
ultimately relating Origen’s allegory to the allegorical rehabilitation for which Gadamer calls. 
Following this observation, I will discuss the relationship between text and action on a 
more theoretical level, not offering any specific historical figure or scenario in which allegory is 
employed. Rather, I will explore the relationship between Truth and fiction, especially as 
articulated in the thought of Clarence Walhout, literary critic, who argues that the relationship 
between fiction and ethics is more important and profound than might be immediately apparent, 
an observation that, once noticed, can hardly be ignored in working toward a complete critical 
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reading of a text. Key to this discussion will be Walhout’s terminology in his examination of this 
relationship: his notions of textual referent, that which exists only as idea within the text, and 
mimesis, that which is taken by the reader to be in relationship with the referent, are fundamental 
in developing a coherent allegorical methodology, especially if it is the intention of the 
interpreter to apply the text to the actual world and society in some kind of prescriptive, 
effective, or meaningful way. I will give particular attention to communities that assign 
literature, as well as communities that read the assigned literature, acknowledging that the 
relationship between text and reader(s) is both personal and social in scope and effect, thus 
clarifying Gadamer’s notion of Anwendung as both personal and social. 
Finally, I will consider the experience of African Americans and the African American 
use of allegory in interpreting the Bible theologically. Beginning with the methodological and 
teleological difference (different from European and European American) of African American 
biblical interpretation, I will consider African American theological allegory in comparison to 
Origen’s theological allegory and will show them to be methodologically similar. Beyond this, I 
will argue that they both fulfill Gadamer’s standard for Truth, being revelatory of what it means 
to be human at a given point in history, which is an idea that will henceforth be rendered 
“revelatory of human being,” or “being human.” In conclusion, I will show how African 
American allegoresis and Origen’s allegoresis, both in strong relationship to Gadamer’s notion 
of allegory, are worthy and valid candidates to be historical examples of allegorical interpretation 
that can be used by a contemporary audience toward a reinvigoration of allegoresis of the Bible 
(or any communally-relevant text) that will render the abstract text referents of the text well into 
coherent mimetic correlations that are both relevant and revelatory of human being. This process 
is therefore liberating for the human person who experiences the actual world within history, a 
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person with the potential to have his/her life transformed by a dramatic worldview reimagining 
using the philosophical mechanism of allegory. 
2. Interpretive Allegory and Its Places 
 Take, for an illustration, this story about a counselor who helps children who have 
recently lost parents or other close loved ones. During one of these grief-counseling sessions, the 
counselor lets a child play “angry birds” on a cell phone, since children’s attention spans are 
apparently quite shorter than those of most healthy adults, and the mindless distraction, oddly 
enough, can aid a child in concentrating on the conversation at hand. The two of them discuss 
what it is like to lose a parent and what it is like to be without them; the counselor is doing his 
best to describe the grieving process to the child in terms that he can understand, until the child 
speaks up after some very serious reflection. In a voice with more authority than he realized, the 
child tells the counselor that “grief is just like ‘angry birds.’ You have got your house all set up, 
and everything’s fine, and, out of nowhere, something strikes and your whole world falls apart 
and right on top of you.” 
 The story is quite touching, but this is hardly the point. I have not bothered to research 
the reasons for the development of the game “Angry Birds,” but I assume that the game was not 
invented in order to offer grieving children a simplified and interactive model by which to come 
to an understanding of their emotions connected with grief (however noble a goal this might 
have been). The counselor in the story, for all the reader knows, has no intention of 
communicating the emotions of grief to the child via the cell phone game. There are two 
possibilities that are not mutually exclusive; either the child somehow makes sense of his own 
situation through an interpretation of the game he is playing, the child makes sense of the game 
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through an interpretation of his experience that is then applied to the game, or both of these are 
happening at the same time. Either way, the child has better understood his own condition and 
can explain it using the illustration of the game, or (more appropriately) the allegory of Angry 
Birds. This very simple allegory representing his experience with grief not only serves as an 
explanation and microcosm of his experience, but also as a game-World and device that is itself 
understandable through the lens of grief. Even beyond this, the game serves the child (and 
potentially any grieving person) as a catalyst for catharsis achieved through understanding and 
meaningful connection through the practical application of symbol and allegory toward the goal 
of revelation of human being. 
 Of course, these conclusions reached about allegory and symbol regarding a story about a 
child and a cell phone game are drawn from an illustration that is simple, elementary, personal, 
and easy to understand. I would argue, however, that the principles are constant, even if the 
parameters of the model are extrapolated for a wider and more complex personal, communal, or 
social reality. Just as there is a story World in which the child experiences pain, grief, and 
longing for meaningful connection and understanding, there is also an actual World in which 
actual people experience actual events and then meaningfully connect them to (and understand 
them in relationship to) other events in their actual lives, the lives of others, or in meaningful 
stories perpetuated by their individual communities or societies of origin. These Worlds of 
connection, symbol, and allegory, best exemplified by the game World of the child, are those 
fictional worlds of parallel experience that inform existence in the actual world, a relational 
dimension in which one is in dynamic conversation with his/her experience, an artistic way of 
living in which anything experienced has the potential to be related to the experiencer, who is the 
interpreter. 
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This kind of thinking, of course, is not new, and I intend to make an argument concerning 
the usefulness of symbol, allegory, and their immediate value for the human experience. In 
making this argument, I intend to concentrate primarily on Hans-Georg Gadamer, who argues for 
a revaluation and rehabilitation of interpretive allegory in the postmodern West, observing that 
(given the recent dawn and flourishing of science and the rigorous scientific method) interpretive 
allegory has largely fallen out of fashion as a tool that is capable of assisting an interpreter in 
having any kind of real knowledge. I will also give substantial attention to the biblical allegoresis 
of Origen of Alexandria (and the Stoic philosophical influences that undergirds much of his 
philosophical allegory). I will give abundant attention to an exploration of the kerygmatic aspects 
of fiction writing, or the argument that fiction not only already contains an ethical dimension, but 
that it is also a possible and valid source of ethical exhortation or ethical axioms by which 
persons as individuals or as members of communities make sense of the world morally. Toward 
an investigation into this phenomenon, I will examine certain communities and the certain 
respective texts around which they are gathered or are drawn. For instance, it has generally been 
true for decades now that Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn has been taught 
literature in (particularly American) schools, and several decades is a substantial amount of time. 
It is doubtful that the novel has been taught in schools for decades without sufficient reason; 
thus, I plan to organize my argument in explanation of this reasoning by way of two mutually 
dependable (yet potentially mutually inclusive) communities of persons: the assigning 
community and the learning community. Of course, it should be noted that it is possible for one 
person to be a member of both communities that go toward the sustentation and 
reimagination/reinvention of the Western literary canon. What will be necessary at this point of 
inquiry is the theoretical relevance of allegory and allegorical interpretation to assigning 
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communities and learning communities in their interpretations of the canonical literature that has 
an effect on the actual world, not only for their communities of interpretations, but for 
themselves as individuals within communities doing ethical reflections on the actual world. The 
African American biblical tradition will also be discussed and interpreted (in part) through 
Gadamer and in relationship to Origen’s allegorical interpretation, as African American 
interpretive methodologies are quite different from the biblical interpretive methodologies 
specific to Gadamer’s (or Origen’s) social stance. Beyond this, the African American interpretive 
tradition is one rooted in the experience of oppression and brutality, and it rightly gives primary 
consideration to this experience as authoritative in an honest engagement with any communally 
relevant literature, which certainly includes the Bible, and it tends to engage the text as a World 
and identity source, often a source of strength and social criticism. These conclusions were often 
reached using methodology that embraced allegory as a valid and valuable part of any 
interpretive work done in community.
1
 
Gadamer argues that allegorical interpretation is of immense value when interpreting the 
artistic from any time (which will reveal non-falsifiable Truth) and that denial of truth outside 
the scientific method is equivalent to limiting human being. In the same way, I will argue that art 
from a different World (a World consisting of people with different horizons than we have in the 
present) cannot be explained well, understood appropriately and, thus, applied to one’s life 
without a healthy relationship with signs, symbols, allegory, and (perhaps most arguably) 
pragmatics (that is, the sign, symbol, or allegory is not best understood until it has been applied 
in a practical way).
2
 In bridging two Worlds that would, otherwise, never connect through the 
                                                 
1
 Vincent L. Wimbush, The Bible and African Americans: A Brief History (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
2003): 28-9. 
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interpretation of art from the past, it is necessary to show one’s work through the allegorical 
process, but also show how that interpretation matters today. The pragmatic piece of the puzzle 
is application (or exhortation in cases of Origen’s biblical exegesis or African American 
engagement with community and society). The Bible, a work of art in its own right, is the 
product of minds from another social World, and it seems that an audience cannot correctly 
understand what it means today without exploring its use of the symbolic and recognizing the 
possible allegorical systems that are capable of informing the lives in the contemporary social 
World, including the life of the interpreter, as if the interpretive process will lead the interpreter 
and his/her audience to recognize the other side of a metaphorical coin, the other side of which 
will show him/her the Truth behind the physical reality that s/he experiences. 
As the artistic interpretation of symbols and allegory is in itself the connecting-link 
between two parallel lines of an imagined Scriptural, fictional, or otherwise artistic World of the 
encountered text and the actual social World of the individual, community, or society who 
interprets (or for whom the text is interpreted)—it is semiotics (perhaps more accurately, the 
pragmatic effect of interpreted symbol and allegory) that bridges the chasm from dead 
history/lifeless unity of a text into a kerygmatic exercise in revitalized and reinterpreted truth in 
time. Given Gadamer’s vision for a revaluation of allegory within a postmodern setting, it is 
necessary to first consider the meaning and limits of that desired revaluation. Beyond this, it is 
also necessary to determine which versions of allegorical interpretation are worthy of 
examination and redevelopment in a contemporary setting. I plan to argue that (given a certain 
                                                                                                                                                             
2
 The concept of World, here, is related to the concept of horizon, but these are distinct. While a horizon 
functions on the individual (or at best communal) level, Worlds are more comprehensive and social, consisting of 
individuals of varying horizons. As social Worlds move apart gradually through time, similar individual horizons 
become less and less likely to exist in two separate Worlds, until it becomes impossible, or at least implausible. 
One’s individual horizon, thus, depends on one’s social World. 
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understanding of fiction’s relationship to Truth via reference and mimesis) the ancient allegorical 
methodology of Origen of Alexandria is of particular value to this very present hermeneutical 
debate. The African American (allegorical) engagement with the Bible (when read through 
Gadamer) is also of special interest because of its relationship to Gadamer’s distinct view of 
Truth and its purpose and function as source of social criticism, personal identity, and strength 
within the African American interpretive community. The postmodern rehabilitation of 
interpretive allegory (as Gadamer envisions it) will be actualized to the benefit of society only if 
proper consideration and authority is given to those individuals (and communities) in history 
who have best exemplified the allegorical purpose and methodology that Gadamer argues to be 
appropriate, useful, and revelatory of human being. 
Perspectives on Gadamer’s Allegorical Theory: A Response to De Man 
In his 1969 essay, “The Rhetoric of Temporality,”3 Paul de Man, intellectual 
contemporary with Hans-Georg Gadamer, interprets Gadamer’s reflections on semiotics and the 
postmodern revitalization of aesthetics via subjectivism and individualism (particularly the 
opposition of symbol and allegory according to the individualist interpretation) as an indication 
that Gadamer believed symbol and allegory, though both interpretive tools, to have nearly 
opposite relationships to individual freedom.
4
 Gadamer argues that, while the symbol may 
function several ways within a single horizon, allegory is limited to a single function within a 
system and, after having been utilized in achieving its purpose, is spent of all its utility and will 
be of no further service to the interpreter. Gadamer’s own words, in fact, describe symbol as 
                                                 
3
 Charles S. Singleton, ed., Interpretation: Theory and Practice (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 
1969): 174. 
 
4
 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. and rev. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall 
(New York: Continuum, 1994): 42-80, esp. 70-72. 
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“endlessly suggestive” and “indefinite (in) its meaning,” while describing allegory as opposed to 
symbol “as art is to non-art.”5 Some explication of what art is to these thinkers may be necessary, 
but suffice it to say here that they are almost certainly not in precise agreement on even the 
definition of (non) art. De Man interprets Gadamer’s language here as suggesting that allegory is 
dry, overly-rational, and potentially dogmatic; even while we must acknowledge that this is 
indeed a possibility, it need not be the only interpretation of this distinction. In fact, I intend to 
argue that this is not only a misinterpretation of Gadamer’s broader distinction, but also that 
Gadamer’s specific contrast of symbol and allegory in this instance (if taken at face value and 
outside the context of this great thinker’s Magnum Opus) does not accurately reflect his argued 
reality of allegory elsewhere in Truth and Method, especially as allegory applies to art and 
knowledge, nor does it reflect the reality of allegory as it has been presented, synthetically or 
otherwise, elsewhere in the Western (postmodern) interpretive tradition with which Gadamer is 
in implicit dialogue, the contexts out of which he is arguing interpretive allegory ought to be 
reinvigorated, though these other positions from the greater tradition on the proper place of 
allegory are, admittedly, not in view within de Man’s specific statement. Rather than arguing for 
the rehabilitation of an interpretive tool that has been (at times) known to be overly-rational or 
dogmatic, it seems more plausible that Gadamer is arguing for the rehabilitation of an 
interpretive tool from a context in which that tool was utilized, not just as a dry catechetical 
device, but as a democratized communicator of a text that, to the interpreter’s mind, deserved 
humanization.
6
 That is, Gadamer certainly argues for the rehabilitation of a certain allegorical 
method (that is, he is being selective about what kind of allegory ought to be reinvigorated), a 
                                                 
 
5
 Ibid, 70. 
6
 Ibid, 309. Gadamer references the allegorical interpretation of the Bible within the Church—specifically 
the Christian interpretation of the gospel, which he argued to be distinct and to which he gave special attention. 
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methodology that ought not to be the kind of allegory that de Man has in mind, since allegory 
has been treated differently within different horizons; this is crucial, as many forms of allegory 
are less vulnerable to the reproach of excessive rationality. 
For ages, allegory was too often subject to the abuse of dogmatists, and, following the 
European Baroque period, it fell sharply out of fashion in artistic interpretation.
7
 However, it 
seems that the reason(s) for allegory’s past successes and modern aversions come from outside 
the realm of allegory itself. That is to say, allegorical interpretations that might carry any kind of 
meaningful authority are impossible without an authoritative tradition upon which they may be 
founded and within which they may be interpreted. The modernist distrust of tradition as a 
source of authority inescapably implies a distrust of allegory within an increasingly “free” 
aesthetic framework.
8
 Thus far, allegory and symbol have been argued to be in opposition and, 
while this can certainly be true for Gadamer, it has not always necessarily been so, and it has 
been precisely false for many, as Joel Weinsheimer reminds us: “It is worth recalling that symbol 
and allegory—like imagination and fancy—were for centuries used as synonyms, and that in 
antiquity they were not antithetical but simply unrelated.”9 This was true of antiquity, not 
because symbol and allegory were not both hermeneutical devices (for surely they were and are 
to a certain extent),
10
 but because allegory (when used in antiquity) belonged to the “sphere of 
                                                 
7
 Ibid, 79. 
 
8
 Ibid, 79. “With the breakup of this tradition allegory too was finished. For the moment art freed itself 
from all dogmatic bonds and could be defined as the unconscious production of genius, allegory inevitably became 
aesthetically suspect.” Allegory requires meanings more fixed and subject to rational discussion than symbols 
require. In an environment that considered itself more liberated from ancient dogmatism and mythology, the symbol, 
the freer of the two interpretive forms discussed here, could not fail to triumph over its counterpart. 
 
9
 Joel Weinsheimer, Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading of Truth and Method (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1985): 89. 
 
10
 In both structures, one thing is said instead of another, but both are intended to illuminate the other, and 
the meaning of both utterances is thus enriched. 
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the logos,”11 as Gadamer puts it; that is, it belonged to the arena of discussion, of language, and it 
was therefore a figure utilized in the clarification of meaning through this rational engagement in 
dialogue with a mind other than one’s own. Symbol, on the other hand, while its meaning(s) can 
be deciphered to the uninitiated via explanation, communicates its meaning simply by its being: 
“its sensory existence has ‘meaning.’ As something is shown, it enables one to recognize 
something else.”12 This distinction is key, not only for its own sake, but for the sake of my 
argument.  
While symbol communicates via being, allegory is verbal discourse and, even for initiates 
within a community that discusses and revolves around a text, must come from the mind of an 
interpreter who makes an argument based on the shared text of the community and their shared 
understanding of what that text means, should mean, and has meant in the past. This form of 
allegory, while not necessarily abusive or manipulative in itself, can be dogmatic insofar as it has 
the potential for instructive usage, and it seems that Gadamer is arguing that a form of allegorical 
interpretation that does not rely solely upon the authority of a rationalized interpretation of a 
cryptic text for its own sake, but rather an allegorical interpretation given or taught from a text 
within the framework of a community’s shared experience together (with that text) ought to be, 
not only permissible, but encouraged; this is the religious function of allegory and its use in the 
interpretation of art toward a goal.
13
 This goal, as Gadamer puts it, is itself the communal 
struggle toward the recognition of a valid Truth behind a text, a Truth that is otherwise 
concealed. The purpose of allegory, then (in this light), is hardly overly-dogmatic or overly-
                                                 
 
11
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 72. 
12
 Ibid. 
 
13
 Ibid, 73. Allegory arises from the theological need to eliminate offensive material from a religious text—
originally from Homer—and to recognize valid truths behind it. 
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rational, but is instead the tool by which a community engages its authoritative artwork or other 
authoritative aesthetic construct in an honest effort to experience it together so that, through 
these efforts, the artwork might reveal Truth about human being in the world.
14
 It is this specific 
kind of allegory that Gadamer seems to be arguing needs revaluation within our Western, 
postmodern context. 
Thomas Kiefer, discussing Gadamer’s unique understanding of Truth, especially in 
comparison with Heidegger’s different conception, comments that Truth, to Gadamer, “emerges 
in acts of understanding that embrace rather than deny the disclosure of human being, a process 
which requires a hermeneutical and dialogical engagement with an other.”15 This is a view of 
Truth in which the individual actively and creatively engages the world and the “Other” in 
her/his quest for a disclosure of Self, as opposed to a more Heideggerian position that would 
have the individual’s Self passively revealed by the world in which s/he is.16 More simply, 
Gadamer posits a more active individual in his view of Truth and the Truth-seeker, while 
Heidegger suggests an individual that is passive but is revealed by an active world; both 
understandings of Truth involve the Self (or Selves, if the engagement is done in community) in 
engagement with an environment or social setting. Moreover, and in conjunction with this idea 
of a personal and active engagement with the world, Jean Grondin, in his biography of Gadamer, 
writes: 
                                                 
 
14
 Ibid, 85. Art does not contain truth and, thus, truth cannot simply be removed from the art and distributed 
to the community—the hermeneutical task is one that reveals truth: identity of self, for instance. 
 
15
 Thomas Kiefer, “Hermeneutical Understanding as the Disclosure of Truth: Hans-Georg Gadamer’s 
Distinctive Understanding of Truth,” Philosophy Today 57, no. 1 (2013): 42. 
 
16
 Ibid, 42. 
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The universe of our life and intercourse with each other, of what can be brought to 
language and shared, our love, our sympathies and antipathies, the life of 
unconceptualizable affects—all of this remains far removed from the areas that are 
subject to the control of method. And yet here too a “truth” is experienced that we share, 
communicate and live by. This is the hermeneutic truth with which Truth and Method is 
concerned.
17
 
To Gadamer, this active and intentional communication that one does within his/her community 
that is directed at the world in which that community finds itself is part of a process in which 
allegorical interpretation of communally relevant texts is acceptable and encouraged, but in light 
of this distinctive understanding of a Truth that cannot fall subject to the specific, empirical 
methodological critiques to which other forms of knowledge do, it seems Gadamer is indicating 
that allegorical interpretation as a path toward this kind of Truth/knowledge (love, sympathy, 
etc.) is not subject to a more objective methodological critique, and of course I agree that it is 
not. Again, this does not mean that a more subjective methodological critique (even emerging 
out of the community of interpretation) is out-of-bounds. Put differently (and in illustration), a 
critique stating that allegory is too dogmatic is a methodological critique, because the text can be 
dogmatic only in relationship to an audience. If we can agree that it is possible for dogmatism to 
lend itself to an interpretive methodology, which is generally acknowledged to be the case, the 
valid critique here is one of dogmatism, not allegory, which can lend itself to dogmatism, but 
will not necessarily do so. Overly-dogmatic approaches may not embrace the disclosure of 
human being and understanding, which, again according to Gadamer’s view, is a prerequisite for 
the revelation of Truth.
18
 Valid allegorical interpretation that is worthy of revaluation, then, will 
come out of a tradition that is subject to the authority of the community it supports. The 
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methodological process of understanding and disclosing True Self and/or Social Self through 
dialogue with the “Other” and works of art are thus democratized. 
 
 
Allegory, Art, and Knowledge in Truth and Method 
The democratization of allegorical methodology and its validation has led (or should 
lead, at least) to communities’ reconsidering the nature of Truth as it relates to time and human 
being, especially communities whose textual sources of authority come from horizons and 
Worlds other than those to which they themselves belong or have belonged.
19
 This process of 
understanding what a text says in this World must begin with the contemporary readers’ 
questioning of their own historical conditioned-ness, along with that of the text and the 
worldview out of which it was conceived. Anthony Thiselton writes: 
We are…faced with the undeniable fact that if a text is to be understood there must occur 
an engagement between two sets of horizons (to use Gadamer’s phrase), namely those of 
the ancient text and those of the modern reader or hearer. The hearer must be able to 
relate his own horizons to those of the text. Gadamer compares the analogy of the 
“understanding” which occurs in a conversation. “…In a conversation, when we have 
discovered the standpoint and horizon of the other person, his ideas become intelligible, 
without our necessarily having to agree with him.
20
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to other communities who revere documents from other social worlds and individual horizons. 
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Using Gadamer, Thiselton is making the assertion that should have been obvious all along: a 
reader need not accept the worldview of the text if s/he is attempting to understand it, but it is 
important that the worldview be engaged and acknowledged if any transaction is to take place at 
all. Beyond this, Thiselton asserts that, when approaching an ancient text (or, I would argue, any 
art, textual or otherwise), we bring first our own experiences and a desire for their interpretation 
according to the worldview of another or others deemed suitable for this.
21
 Therefore, regardless 
of whether or not one considers allegory an appropriate tool for the interpretation of texts, it is 
entirely possible (if not very likely) that the worldview of an ancient text might expect 
interpretive allegory to be applied by a reader or hearer to the artwork coming out of it. This is 
part and parcel to the Gadamerian “conversation” leading to discovery of a new horizon and 
possible alternative perspectives that can then be either accepted or rejected for the reader’s 
present time, but this eventual acceptance or rejecting bears no judgment on the validity of the 
ancient worldview within its own time, as the warranted-ness of a position is judged according to 
the time out of which it came and what worldview(s) were appropriate and/or possible at that 
time. Crucial for Gadamer, however, is the idea of the transcendence of the artistic 
consciousness, as opposed to the historically conditioned consciousness of the artist or 
interpreter. In other words, a work of art will necessarily relate to many horizons and/or Worlds, 
since minds from different times will each bring their own desire for interpretation (or desire for 
catharsis) to that which offers it (art, including texts). Therefore, (as it is widely acknowledged) 
there is no objective interpretation of any piece of artwork; conversely, since art is said to be 
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transcendent in a sense,
22
 it is possible to say that, while no single mind (or group of minds) has 
access to an objective interpretation of a historical work of art that is revelatory of human being 
(Truth), it is possible that a mind has (or group of minds have) a relative access to Truth revealed 
by art. The Truth of one age will not necessarily be the same Truth of another, but it is possible 
for the same work of art to be revelatory of two distinct Truths within two distinct Worlds and 
still be the same transcendent whole, a position taken mostly from Gadamer’s reflection, but one 
nonetheless finding some historical precedent in Patristic-era biblical interpretation, especially as 
it relates to allegory and its use in the interpretation of the Bible on an individual, communal, 
social, or even metaphysical plane—this is seen perhaps most clearly (at least in Patristic-era 
Christian biblical interpretation) in the exegetical practice, exhortative sermons, and allegorical 
methodology of Origen of Alexandria, a figure who will eventually receive attention as he 
pertains to the contemporary revaluation of allegory and its historical precedent. 
To Gadamer, art is both necessarily timeless and necessary for all times, since an age’s 
art leads to that age’s Truth,23 and in his estimation, an artist (and a responsible interpreter of 
Truth) will not necessarily speak for a community, but for his/her own idea of what could be.
24
 
By relying on his/her own historical consciousness (coupled with creativity and imagination), the 
artist will reimagine history and produce an artistic objectification of Truth as it is understood to 
exist temporally to the necessarily historically-conditioned artistic consciousness. This is 
possible through both the creation and interpretation of art, but responsible completion of either 
is possible only through understanding. In relation to Origen, this sounds similar to the role of 
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the ecclesial biblical interpreter: through an “artistic” discovery of Sacred Truth in Sacred 
Scripture (through allegoresis, or allegorical exegesis), the interpreter draws out from the past’s 
artwork that which once was not understood, and this is done for the purpose of a new 
understanding at a new point in history. Put differently, the acquisition of Truth for the present is 
possible through the interpretation of artwork from the past, but it requires interpretation from 
the present.
25
 In discovering artistic Truth, Gadamer considers the roles of symbol and allegory 
to be paramount, and they aid the human in his/her discovery of that which is transcendent.
26
  It 
will therefore be necessary to explore the nature of Gadamer’s understanding of symbol and 
allegory, especially as it relates to Patristic biblical interpretation and the production of an 
exhortation/kerygma based upon an authoritative text. 
 To Gadamer, an artist’s intelligent handling of words in their forms and modes of 
meaning contributes to the production of a literary artistic unity. That is, the manipulation of 
signs, whether of language or otherwise, contributes to artistic expression of any kind, but this is 
especially noticeable in the literary arts and their use of language,
27
 since words (either 
individual words or phrases) can so easily stand for things beyond themselves, and in fact 
sometimes they must. Symbol and allegory, while distinct from one another, have something 
profound in common: in both cases, one thing will stand for another;
28
 the symbol’s meaning is 
related first to its literal sense, then to the end of its interpretive possibility according to the 
                                                 
 
25
 Ibid, 51. 
 
26
 Ibid, 46. In Truth and Method, Gadamer argues for a rehabilitation of allegory primarily in relation to 
humanity’s understanding of artistic expression. This includes the biblical text, but Gadamer later clarifies that the 
Bible, should the Church interpret it, is to be interpreted with a goal in mind. Rehabilitation of allegory thus applies 
to both the Bible and the rest of artwork but is to be taken differently in each case. 
 
27
 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 71. 
 
28
 Ibid, 72. 
Weinzierl 23 
 
context in which it is interpreted. That is, the effect of the symbol is rooted in its literal being, 
which is objectified and, thus, cannot change, but the artistic effect that the symbol has upon 
human being will not cease at the literal and, therefore, it must change, according to how being is 
functioning within each human mind: it is taken to the end of the potentiality of its meaning 
according to the interpreter’s knowledge of the text’s history of interpretation 
(Wirkungsgeschichte), the interpreter’s experience of the symbolic, and the interpreter’s position 
in time.
29
 Thus, the symbol is simultaneously a textual link to the past and a potential source of 
kerygmatic application (Anwendung) in the present through an interpreter’s relative access to the 
transcendent Truth the artwork reveals in time. 
 On the other hand, allegory, while it, too, will stand for something beyond itself, is 
distinct from symbol, as I have been saying, not so much because of its sphere of categorization 
(as in antiquity), but because of its function. According to Gadamer, “‘Allegory’ originally 
belonged to the sphere of talk, of the logos, and is therefore a rhetorical or hermeneutical figure. 
Instead of what is actually meant, something else, more tangible is said, but in such a way that 
the former is understood.”30 Allegory, understood this way, not only goes beyond what is 
actually said and meant by the text, showing the meaning to have implications far beyond the 
literal, but it functions in a hermeneutical way so that the literal is understood in terms of the 
allegory. In other words, allegory functions, not only as path toward kerygma, but as explanation 
(Erklärung) of the literal, not only as a tool for an ethical exhortation, but also as a tool that will 
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illuminate a meaning of the story that is being allegorized. For instance, in reference to Mark 
Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, an allegory dealing with Huck Finn, a free white child, 
and Jim, the slave, rafting down the Mississippi River, literally between free states and slave 
states in American territory could be allegorized so that it is understood to stand for a certain 
individual’s (or community’s) experience grappling with what slavery and freedom are today in 
American life (as opposed to what they were in the past or are in the text) and his/her/their 
assigning of these text-references of slave-free distinctions in the novel to things and experiences 
in the actual world of human experience. This is the allegorical process. It involves a thorough 
examination of what is going on in the text and the assigning of these references to things in the 
“actual” world. That is, it involves both reference within a text and mimesis by those who read 
the text in order to inform their human being.
31
 Gadamer’s point beyond this is simply that this 
allegory, which has made the story personal, communal, or both, will then be used by the 
interpreter and interpretive community as its own synthetic system for viewing the world and for 
reading the text out of which it was drawn. 
 Gadamer’s argument not only seems to be that this kind of interpretation of another 
horizon’s text is not only warranted but crucial if the interpreter is going to reveal the meaning of 
the text, since, to Gadamer, understanding the meaning of the text cannot exist apart from its 
application or an understanding of its significance: 
It is important to note here that Gadamer’s position does not merely overlook a 
distinction between understanding meaning and understanding significance; it denies one. 
On his view, we understand the meaning of a text, work of art or historical event only in 
relation to our own situation and therefore in light of our own concerns. In other words 
we understand it only in light of its significance.
32
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This may seem radical, but, upon reflection, it is hardly so within the postmodern context in 
which we find it, though there is (of course) a certain degree of tension between this conception 
of meaning/significance and a more classical conception.
33
 Understanding a horizon from the 
past, for example, is not viewed as something that is done outside of one’s own concerns.34 We 
engage Huck Finn and Jim’s relationship through the lens of slavery and freedom in America 
because this is a relevant question for our situation today, and the conclusions we glean from our 
interpretations will inform, not only our worldview of the actual world, but our view of the text 
out of which these conclusions come.  
What is less radical than it is revolutionary is Gadamer’s contention that the modernist 
and Enlightenment-era ways of “knowing,” while they are certainly genius and worthy of 
continuation, have (by their demands of certain methodologies and post-Enlightenment, 
European definitions of history) excluded many other ways by which human beings come to 
knowledge, and symbol and allegory (he argues) are both ways in which human beings have 
historically come to knowledge, and they are both still valid ways in which humans can come to 
know certain things of a non-falsifiable nature, even if one or both of them is in need of a certain 
level of rehabilitation, as Clarence Walhout accurately observes in Gadamer: 
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We can see in Gadamer the tension between older conceptions of truth and modern 
conceptions of historicity. In the first part of Truth and Method, Gadamer sets out to 
distance himself from the subjectivism of the Kantian tradition of aesthetics and Kant’s 
view that knowledge and art are as unmixable as oil and water. In contrast, he asserts his 
view “that art is knowledge.” Our responses to art are cognitive as well as aesthetic, and 
therefore we “hope to understand better what kind of truth it is that encounters us there.35 
The assertion to which Walhout is drawing attention is drawn up into a tidy maxim that “art is 
knowledge,” which can be misleading; surely, it dabbles in a bit of hyperbole, but it is true that 
Gadamer wants his audience to know that art and human knowledge have a great deal to do with 
one another, as opposed to the assertions of some earlier philosophers who would say things to 
the contrary. As art is cognitively investigated through human consciousness, Gadamer argues 
that the experience achieved with and through art (whether allegorical or otherwise) can lead a 
person to knowledge just as warranted and justified as any other “methodology.” The experience 
of art is therefore valued as a kind of pseudo-epistemological foundation.
36
 That which is 
experienced by the creative person is then purified and objectified, intended to convey this 
experience to those who would interpret, who then come to an understanding of this artwork by 
virtue of their own experience(s) to which the artwork will speak. This inter-horizon 
communication of knowledge, as it were, is what Gadamer aptly names and describes as the 
“Fusion of Horizons” that is necessary in this kind of interpretive work. That is, meaningful 
interpretation (that is applied and understood as personal or concrete rather than abstract) can be 
accomplished through allegory or some other interpretive method, but there must be a 
communication between the World of the text and the World of the interpreter or interpreting 
community; beyond this, when the interpreter understands the social World out of which the text, 
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artwork, etc. is coming and how/why it is making its argument, the interpreter will not only be 
better informed about the art’s potential for revelation of human being but will also then have a 
bit of the authorial stance (or authorial horizon/World) as a very real part of his/her own horizon, 
and, thus, a fusion of horizons has occurred. 
 
 
The Fusion of Horizons and the Individual Self 
 If these two Worlds (the World of the text and the World of the reader/hearer) are to 
participate in some kind of transaction (meaning that the first World is to inform the second in 
some way) then this engagement is possible only through the relation of the reader/hearer’s 
World to the World of the text, and (at least initially) it cannot be the other way around. Put 
differently (and using Gadamer’s vocabulary), the reader’s own horizon and social World is the 
starting point, and making sense of a past horizon and social World, even if it is done using art 
and documents from an ancient World, must be done from the present and according to a present 
worldview (even if that worldview includes a knowledge of the worldview of the text), and it 
cannot be done the other way around, which sounds like a truism. The implications, however, are 
more profound than we might expect: in this transaction that is dynamic conversation between 
reader, historical text, and the world, the reader may identify the historical conditioned-ness of 
the text’s horizon, and (as history informs his/her consciousness) the text’s ideas will become 
increasingly intelligible without the reader necessarily having to give assent to the historical 
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standpoint as a valid opinion at his/her own point in history.
37
 Moreover, while discovery of a 
new position doesn’t imply agreement with that position, hearing the ideas for which the text is 
arguing and explicating (under the assumption that they are at least valid for their point in 
history) is not only useful, but necessary for the understanding or application of that text in the 
present, and action, given the nature of textual authority as it functions within communities 
surrounding certain texts, is a vital component of interpretation. 
 This, of course, presupposes that the meaning of an interpreted text will go far beyond the 
author’s context; if two Worlds are to be connected by meaning, this meaning will not 
necessarily be limited to what the author either intended or imagined as possible within the 
framework of possible authorial worldviews, or authorial stance(s).
38
 The reinterpretation of a 
historical text in the present (and the reimagining of the possibility of meaning), therefore, is not 
necessarily unfaithful to the tradition under which the text was composed: making a text of a 
different World speak to a second World will require a reinterpretation within the context of the 
interpreted text itself. For instance, one of Shakespeare’s plays would have been well-performed 
in sixteenth or seventeenth century England if it had been performed outside, the cast had been 
all male, and so on, according to the standards of Elizabethan and Jacobean theater; however, a 
reproduction of the same play (that is, performing it to standards that an Elizabethan or Jacobean 
audience would have expected and to which they would have responded positively) will not 
necessarily speak to the present World in the same way as it would have done in its World of 
composition. For this reason, the process of making sense of a text (and displaying one’s 
conclusions to an audience) will necessarily be creative and cannot be merely reproduction.
39
 A 
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reinterpretation and re-appropriation of a play by Shakespeare might include female cast 
members, an indoor theater, or even a non-live production. These are things that may or may not 
have been impossible in a past World that have now become possible within more present social 
contexts, and they are things that people of present contexts have often come to expect. The text 
(present in both Worlds) is thus limited to the constraints of neither World, as the social 
arguments that texts make are not necessarily limited to the contexts in which they were 
originally conceived and argued. Thus, a reinterpretation (that is, a production including female 
cast members, put on indoors, etc.) of Shakespeare in a present context that has a similar effect 
on an audience as the play did in Elizabethan or Jacobean England can be understood as a truer 
representation of the text than a reproduction might have been;
40
 therefore, it can be said that the 
interpretation of authoritative texts in general must be more than the reconstruction of a past 
meaning, significance, or application (since this is only part of the process). Rather, the 
applications made, significances noted, and meanings explicated ought to be both pertinent to the 
World for which they are drawn up and correspondent to (or at least in acknowledgement of) the 
history of the text’s interpretation. Therefore, a new interpretation of a creative work will itself 
be creative and, therefore, it will be aesthetic in its own right.
41
  
It is worth noting that all of these examples have, of course, been in reference to the few 
persons who provide interpretations of art from past Worlds and horizons, and none of them has 
been in reference to those for whom the interpretation is being done. That is, this presupposes 
and applies only to interpretive structures in which there is an interpreter with authority and a 
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community who grants him/her that authority, or a director of a play (who interprets it) and a 
gathering of people who watch/hear the interpretation, and it is exclusive of an interpretive 
structure that might include audience participation in the production of a play (if such a thing 
exists) or an interpretive community that has no single authoritative interpreter and, rather, does 
the interpretive work communally. This model is not in view here and it is therefore an 
exception, and this exclusion might lead to a (perhaps warranted) criticism that the entire model 
of interpretation upon which Gadamer, Thiselton, and others focus is flawed from the start, given 
the democratic tendencies, trends, and presuppositions of most modern and postmodern contexts 
in the West,
42
 a criticism arguing that proper interpretation of a text granted authority by a 
community is then properly interpreted only by that community (in other words, according to the 
community by which the text receives and for whom it exercises its authority).
43
 In the West, 
authority has been democratized over the past several hundred years, and this democratization 
(along with the rise of individualism in modernity) is something that cannot be overlooked if a 
proper examination of allegorical rehabilitation within Gadamerian and postmodern contexts is 
to be attempted.
44
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 The “Fusion of Horizons,” as Gadamer puts it, is done via text—the vehicle through 
which the fusion of two minds and horizons is made possible. This implies that minds and texts 
function in a “participatory” manner, which is called as such for two distinct but related reasons. 
On the one hand, a mind’s relationship to a text “participates” in its interpretation much in the 
same way as time participates in eternity.
45
 The historical nature of understanding reveals the 
contemporary interpreter’s position in a text’s interpretive history (Wirkungsgeschichte). In this 
sense, a modern interpretation of a Shakespeare play, for instance, would participate in the play’s 
Wirkungsgeschichte similar to the way in which a moment participates in eternity. A single part 
of interpretation history cannot be understood apart from the whole of interpretation history, just 
as a moment cannot be divorced from the moments that surround it, but they are “fused” 
together. On the other hand (and in a different sense), understanding (in Gadamer’s mind) 
requires application and is impossible without it, especially since he argues that humans do not 
understand apart from their own condition and in light of their own concerns. Here, Gadamer 
echoes Aristotle (who has little to say of horizons, but plenty to say of the merits of a practical 
understanding of the abstract).
46
 Here again, there is participation, as human understanding of a 
text presupposes that text’s participation in the life of the one who interprets and understands. To 
continue the Shakespeare example, an interpretation of a play is best understood (or Gadamer 
might say, only understood) in light of our own concerns as people, when we are able to make 
interpretive applications to our experience in the world. These interpretive applications, or 
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hermeneutical leaps, that require fusions of horizons are absolutely essential to the vision of 
allegorical revaluation and/or rehabilitation for which Gadamer calls. An allegorical 
interpretation that has the goal of explaining the precise functions of the natural world or has 
empirical fact as its goal is not what is in view of rehabilitation; rather, the allegory to be 
revalued is that allegory that is revelatory of human being—meaning that this has more to do 
with Gadamer’s distinctive view of human Truth, as this allegory is meant to function within the 
sphere of discourse over human being.
47
 As it is, both of these allegorical models have historical 
precedent, and it seems that Gadamer is simply being a bit selective (and prudent) about which 
allegorical model he views as worthy of revaluation. Though there are several examples of this 
kind of interpretation available, Gadamer chose to give special attention to the Christian 
interpretation of the Bible, which he finds unique among interpretive systems. In the interest of 
examining his choice, I have chosen to briefly investigate the pre-Christian philosophical 
precedent(s) for certain forms of early Christian allegorical interpretation of the Bible (that may 
be excellent models for postmodern revaluation), especially as it exists in the hermeneutics of 
Origen of Alexandria. 
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the lone approach by which human beings come to knowledge, is the methodology that Thiselton might even go so 
far as to call incomplete in the face of the postmodern values of openness and selfhood (or individualism). The 
empirical method, then, as in Gadamer’s view, is incomplete, both as an epistemology and as system for reflecting 
the values of the society in which we now find ourselves. This opens the door, in Thiselton’s mind, to more creative 
approaches to relationships within the human experiences—approaches that do our identities justice, of which intra-
horizon communication (“stepping out of one’s own frame of mind”) is an immense part. 
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2. Origen’s Allegorical Model and Its Relevance in the Present Hermeneutical Debate 
Stoic Allegoresis: A Philosophical Precedent for Allegorical Revaluation? 
 Coming from a camp that demanded acquisition of philosophical truth that is somehow 
applicable to the way in which humans live together in society and in relationship with the gods, 
the Stoic philosophers (of course, along with other Greco-Roman philosophical schools) 
developed their own tradition of a textual exegesis of sorts—allegoresis.48 That is, the 
exegete/philosopher would choose a text understood to be culturally relevant, including cultural 
myth, poetry, or even religious ritual, and then extrapolate and explain the many meanings of the 
text or action existing outside the literal meaning of the text itself by way of allegorical 
interpretation. This means that, according to the Stoics, allegory, while understood to be a 
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literary device, was certainly not limited to that, as it was even primarily philosophical in its 
value and application.
49
 To philosophers like Zeno, Cleanthes, and Cornutus, it is allegory that 
uncovers the hidden truth behind a seemingly mundane and lifeless physical entity, having 
implications for both ancient physics and ethics; that is, a Stoic allegoresis of a text would 
sometimes result in a kind of ethical exhortation, but it would always prove to be the connecting 
link between theology and physics when these things were reached via textual interpretation—it 
is always the link connecting a human perception of the physical and the potential for a human 
understanding of the theology effecting the physical.
50
 
In considering culturally revered texts (like those of Homer or Hesiod), the majority of 
Stoic philosophy seems to contend that realizing what is literally going on in the text is one 
thing, but it is quite another to understand the extrapolated implications of that literal textual  
reality, especially when considering the reality of divine forces to these authors or philosophers. 
It was allegory and its value in the interpretation of these culturally revered texts (along with an 
understanding of the symbolic as it exists in the text and the perceived world) that was 
understood as the best way to express the sublimity of what is divine in the text and in the world. 
In this way, one sees how Stoic allegoresis of a physical reality shows 1) the physics of the 
perceived world and 2) the theology of what is unseen to be intimately connected, as if they are 
two sides of the same coin.
51
 This idea of the perceived world of forms (a Platonic idea, to be 
sure) was interfused with the Stoic philosophy of allegoresis in a revival of Platonic philosophy 
in the Early Christian period (a revival of which Origen was arguably an indispensable part), and 
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this revival provided the Early Church with several of its philosophical underpinnings, including 
allegorical interpretation of texts, perceived reality as potential illusion, and the use of 
reimagined Aristotelian logic to show the interconnectedness between philosophical/theological 
propositions.
52
 During the first century BCE and the first century CE, Greek and Roman 
literature in general had been so influenced by Greco-Roman Stoic philosophy that interpretation 
or understanding of much of it required a working knowledge of Stoic doctrine; since the 
writings of the New Testament emerged toward the end of this period, one would assume that an 
interpreter’s knowledge of Stoic philosophy could only assist his/her understanding, since it has 
so much to do with the authorial stance.
53
 That is, knowledge of the history behind a text’s 
production can only assist an interpreter in his/her task. Discovery of this history, however, 
should not be the end of one’s interpretation (which is true even and especially in the Stoic 
tradition), as this avoids the possibility of application of new knowledge to life, application 
being, arguably, essential to understanding, just as Gadamer would say. 
 It would seem that the purpose of a Stoic allegorical interpretation of a text would be to 
illustrate the intimate connection between the physical perceptions of reality (whether that occurs 
in the lines of an epic poem or elsewhere) and the theological realities (influencing human being 
and Truth) that are interwoven with the physical/literal, but only discoverable through the 
employment of allegorical interpretation. It must be made abundantly clear that the purpose of 
allegoresis, even to the Stoics, was never to do away with the physical/literal level of the text, but 
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to show that it was but one side of reality; the theological level of textual understanding was not, 
in itself, allegorical, but achievable through allegory. That is, allegorical interpretation of a text 
is employed when one wishes to achieve understanding of a divine reality or philosophical truth. 
For the Stoics, it is impossible to reach this philosophical truth from the text without the use of 
allegory. The text should be understood, then, as an object that points the way toward a broader 
philosophical truth, but it is up to the interpreting philosopher (or sage, as the philosopher will 
sometimes be called) to reach that truth and show the divine/philosophical reality existing behind 
this physical world, detailing how this truth is important for the life of a community wishing to 
live enriched by the knowledge of that Truth interpreted from the physical world. That is, the 
references within the texts were recognized not only as things, but as symbols, and their 
relationships were allegorized for the purpose of inspiring mimesis in those for whom the text is 
interpreted. In this way, we might understand the interpreted literature as a kind of art form 
existing physically, yet pointing the way toward something bigger, something existing behind it, 
something discoverable only through interpretation. The Early Church inherited this Stoic 
allegorical tradition, along with numerous other Greco-Roman cultural/societal gems, and it is 
from this Greco-Roman tradition that Origen (and other Church Fathers) draw out their argument 
for what biblical interpretation should be.
54
  
For this reason, I would assert (with others, obviously) that the Stoic philosophers are an 
integral part of Origen’s worldview concerning Scriptural interpretation and cannot be ignored if 
one is considering Origen’s view on allegorical interpretive methodology. That is, Stoic 
allegoresis, while not necessarily identical with Origen’s allegoresis, is a serious philosophical 
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precedent from which he draws his pre-understanding (Vorverständnis) of not only how textual 
interpretation is done, but the goals which it is intended to accomplish for human knowledge and 
being. Moreover, as it is to be argued that Origen’s allegorical method is to be considered in a 
selective postmodern revaluation of interpretive allegory in general, we cannot exclude from our 
examination the authoritative philosophical sources that informed his worldview, especially as 
they influenced his opinions on good and proper Scriptural interpretation. In fact, as this 
interpretive methodology informed Origen’s, it may not be out of the question to consider Stoic 
allegoresis as valid interpretive methodology within postmodern contexts, as the method is quite 
imaginative and hardly seems outdated.  
  
Origen’s Allegoresis and his Biblical Interpretation 
 Artistic textual interpretation, including the kind of allegorical interpretation Gadamer 
believes to be in need of revitalization, finds incredibly relevant precedents throughout the 
history of Christian biblical interpretation, but no figure is quite as famous for allegorizing the 
biblical text as is Origen of Alexandria. Drawing from various ancient philosophical (and 
theological) resources (Stoic and Platonist philosophy, for instance), Origen interpreted his 
community’s authoritative text using those interpretive methods which were not only appropriate 
for the time in which he lived and interpreted, but were also the methods to which his audience 
would have responded, the methods they would have expected; it could be argued, then, that 
interpretation’s appropriateness (at least regarding texts that are given communal authority: a 
complicated and interesting notion in itself that will be fleshed out later) is determined according 
to the normative philosophical stance of the place and time of the interpretation, but its meaning 
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does not cease there.
55
 Just as in my earlier example concerning Shakespeare, the presentation of 
an argument that is drawn out of a text recognized to have communal authority would do itself 
justice to be presented in a manner that is socially expected, not merely socially acceptable, and 
there is a very great distinction here.
56
 The distinction between acceptable and unacceptable 
implies an either/or paradigm, when this may be something of a misconception according to the 
majority of audiences. We are likely safe in the assumption that Origen, since he is using 
allegory, enjoyed an audience that had been conditioned by prior communities in which 
allegoresis was not only warranted, but necessary and expected. It would have been acceptable to 
use the Bible for many purposes (history is one of these, as we see partially within his homilies 
on the book of Joshua
57
), but within Origen’s context, it seems the primary purpose of reading 
the Bible was drawing connections between the literal words of the texts and the spiritual truths 
to which the text pointed—similar to how the Stoic philosophers read their communally revered 
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texts. This was achievable through allegoresis.
58
 Through his allegory, Origen used the 
literal/physical text to interpret and construct the world of human experience for his audience 
rather than using the text to support assertions grounded outside the text. 
Origen did not construct a metaphysical system that was separate from the Bible and then 
use the Bible in its defense, but the other way around—just as Stoic philosophers used 
allegoresis in their explanation/interpretation of myth and the divinity that it revealed,
59
 Origen 
used the Bible to draw out conclusions based on the text itself, but (given his precedent) this 
could not be limited to the literal meaning of the words, since the Stoic tradition with which he 
was arguably familiar and by which his horizon and World were informed taught that this was 
not the method by which an interpreter arrived at truth. The literal level of the text must be 
transcended but also maintained if allegoresis was going to aid an interpreter in arriving at a 
philosophical conclusion congruent with the literal level of a text. The literal level was, 
therefore, fundamental to a text, just as a human body is fundamental to human identity.
60
 
Humanity is arguably more than a collection of individual bodies, and so must texts be more than 
a compilation of individual words with no meanings beyond those that are obvious on the 
surface. That is, the human body is one side of a metaphorical coin (the literal), just as the human 
soul is the other (the spiritual); these two are shown to be connected through allegorical 
interpretation of literal/physical reality. Just as the Stoics understood physics and theology to be 
the two sides of reality linked through allegory (whether in literature or otherwise), so does 
Origen see the Bible and its interpretation. So complete was Origen’s transfer of allegorical 
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interpretation from the Stoic allegoresis of ancient mythology (Homer and Hesiod) to the 
Alexandrian Christian biblical interpretive tradition that Porphyry and Jerome actually 
considered Origen to be the responsible agent of this transition,
61
 however appropriate that 
characterization may or may not have been.
62
 
In his threefold exegetical model of Scripture, Origen is careful to maintain the literal 
level of the text while he allegorizes his way to a meaning that is appropriate for his purposes. 
Interestingly enough, this was a meaning not necessarily understood to be infinitely appropriate, 
or meant for infinite re-appropriation. Unlike the allegoresis of the Stoic philosophers, Origen 
allows for allegorical interpretations of texts to take an interpreter to any number of spiritual 
truths (the third level) that are, quite literally, inexhaustible;
63
 this happens to be in direct 
contrast to the Stoic notion of Cornutus or Cleanthes, who posited that allegoresis will land a 
philosopher at the philosophical truth, a truth that existed on a single level and was capable of 
transcending time just as the text would transcend time, since it was theological truth and, 
therefore, of the gods.
64
 In contrast, Origen’s exegetical model (as seen in various homilies and 
commentaries to be discussed later) allows for a slightly more fluid relationship between the text 
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and its Truth, reminiscent of Paul or Philo’s method of typology, and even (essential to my 
argument) related to Gadamer’s postmodern view of Truth as something historically conditioned, 
something in constant need of reexamination.
65
 One must not lose the historical sense of the 
Scripture when doing allegoresis: the goal is to make the history intelligible and to make the 
effect for the community profound.
66
 Like the Stoics, Origen seeks to show the inter-
connectedness of the material world and the world of the spirit, showing that one world is 
impacted by the other; therefore, the purpose of an allegorical reading is to artistically achieve 
this end
67—to demonstrably prove that spirit and matter are “one” (or peculiarly unified, in a 
way) by using evidence from the text that his community agrees is appropriately relevant. 
Interpretation for Community and Individual: Origen’s Allegorical Purpose 
 The very reality of a text as Scripture seems to drive Origen, not only to make sense of it 
himself, but to turn it into something exhortative for a community; to Origen, the Bible, though it 
consists of individual books, exists as a textual unity by which he seeks to explain theological 
realities for the benefit of his audience and community,
68
 as Anders-Christian Jacobsen 
comments on Origen’s Homilies on the Book of Joshua: 
Origen never doubts that the story of the Israelites’ conquest of the Promised Land is 
historically true. However, he is also convinced that the meaning of the texts is not only 
to be found on the literal or historical levels. There must be more to it. Otherwise the 
book would not have been included in the canon of Holy Scripture. Therefore, in his 
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sermons on the book of Joshua, Origen tries to establish what this deeper meaning of the 
text could be—and explain this to his congregation.69 
Not only is Origen under the impression that the history behind the Scripture is accurate, he is 
also convinced that this story’s presence in the Bible implies its usefulness for the Church, and 
he is determined to uncover these deeper meanings for those who are incapable of uncovering 
them for themselves. Origen is determined to show his congregation (purportedly new converts 
to Christianity who are preparing for baptism) that the world of the text is not only historically 
and literarily complicated in itself, but that it most certainly has implications in the present time 
for the auditors. Origen accomplishes this through his use of allegorical interpretation in 
explaining Joshua, ultimately arriving at a truth for the new converts so that their understanding 
of his truth-point (achieved through allegoresis) might be completed in its application into their 
lives: “When people hear these things, it is likely they say, “What is this to me? What does it 
contribute to me if I know that those who were living in Ai were conquered, as if similar or even 
mightier wars either have not been waged or are being waged?”70 Origen uses the Bible (with 
God’s assistance, according to him) in demonstrating the hidden meaning behind the text of 
Joshua, and he does this, as Jacobsen correctly puts it, “to the benefit of the audience;”71 that is 
to say, it is one of Origen’s goals to show how the Bible is related to the experience of the 
congregation in the actual world.
72
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 The general thrust of Origen’s interpretation of Joshua includes understanding Joshua as 
a literal and historical character, but Jesus as the spiritual Joshua; Joshua leads literal Israel, just 
as Jesus leads the spiritual Israel (the Church), into a new land that is promised to them by God, 
which is interpreted allegorically to mean a new morally perfect place of life in the Church to 
which Christ leads.
73
 The key to any hidden meaning for Origen will be Christ, and he uses this 
key in his interpretations both often and elegantly. His focus, however, is not on the life and 
teachings of Jesus or even Christology, but usually (curiously enough) on soteriology. Origen 
concentrates his focus on the “saving” nature of Christ and how the Church is mysteriously 
bound up in this saving work of Christ;
74
 this is understandable, of course, since this exhortation 
is given to new converts, who would (more than likely) be at least interested to know what Christ 
did/is doing/will do for them, but also (perhaps even more urgently) what to do in order to live a 
Christian life that leads them forward in progress toward the goal of wholeness.
75
 This is a 
pragmatic truth that is discovered allegorically but is immediately applicable for those listening 
to the sermon; its foundations, however, are located in the literal meaning of the text, as Jacobsen 
is careful in pointing out: 
According to Origen, the Israelites’ long journey from Egypt to the Promised Land is 
thus a true historical account about what happened to the Israelites, but at the same 
time—and more importantly—it is also an account instructing catechumens or recently 
baptized Christians about how they must progress morally from their former conditions 
of delusions and idolatry to a morally good life in the church.
76
 
To Origen, the literal level of the text is indispensable, but the deeper meaning of the story is less 
about Joshua’s physical movement in geographical space than about the development of morality 
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in the catechumens Origen addresses. Geographical reality in the text, after all, is not that 
important to the catechumens, but moral instruction might be; therefore, Origen uses the text for 
these purposes. In illustration of the temporal nature of his point, however, I suggest only that 
this was a truth developed for Alexandrian catechumens who were, perhaps, familiar with 
allegoresis, but it is not a truth prepared for an audience today (perhaps with a less robust 
Vorverständnis of allegory). Should one attempt to apply this interpretation to his/her spiritual 
development or personal enrichment, it seems that s/he will first have to bring the allegorically 
obtained idea of moral development into the present (either from Origen’s text or from the book 
of Joshua itself). The point is that application of this truth may not be limited to the audience for 
which it is intended, but (should it be applied to any other audience), that audience will first have 
to make sense of it in the present time and in its context. This may seem like a truism, but 
pragmatic application of a truth into one’s life does require a certain amount of methodological 
work that cannot be neglected. 
 The fact that Origen’s biblical interpretation (or even biblical interpretation in early 
Christianity in general) ends with some kind of argument or exhortation is hardly surprising, 
since biblical interpretation in early Christianity was centered on making the Scriptures not only 
inform but transform the lives of their readers/hearers. Making a distinction between what a 
biblical text meant and what it means is not in view here, as the Scriptures were understood as 
vessels through which the divine Logos addressed present readers and was not limited to the 
history behind the text in doing so; rather, the Scriptures were capable of speaking directly into 
the lives of the readers, a phenomenon achievable through careful biblical examination and 
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interpretation.
77
 Origen, influenced by Stoicism,
78
 understood the unity of the Bible to be the 
embodiment of the Logos on earth and, as such, its literal meanings were connected to hidden 
spiritual truths that, when discovered through allegoresis, were capable of transcending time and 
working toward the transformation of the reader.
79
 The idea of discovery here is, obviously, 
discovery of new and hidden meanings through the process of allegoresis, but the goal of such an 
interpretive strategy is not the process itself but this “transformation” of the reader or receiver of 
the text. The transformation of the reader takes place through the application of the fruits of this 
discovering process; that is, it is through the application of a discovered truth that the reader is 
transformed into something s/he once was not and could not be without the application of the 
discovered truth. 
 In ascending the metaphorical ladder of understanding, the reader passes the literal and 
moral sense of the Scripture, arriving at the third and final stage of truth that is completed in 
application. The goal of this process of understanding, since Origen understood the Bible to be 
the earthly embodiment of the divine Logos, was a mysterious and spiritual ascent of the 
individual that s/he might participate (or even identify) with the Logos that was the spirit behind 
the text.
80
 The process of understanding the spiritual level of Scripture through allegory was seen 
as divine in itself, since this involves movement of the individual reader to an identity more 
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closely associated with the Logos.
81
 Stoics like Cleanthes held that the physical was impacted by 
the spiritual—that physics was one side of a coin, the other side of which was theology.  That is, 
it is one thing to observe physical realities occurring, but another to understand the other half of 
the big picture. The way in which one acquires knowledge of the other side of this coin is 
through an introspective and meditative philosophical process that must include allegoresis of the 
literal/physical without consuming its literal integrity in the allegorical process (the problem 
Gnostics often ran into). In a similar way, we see Origen identifying the one side of the 
philosophical coin in the literal meaning/sense of the Bible. Through his philosophical allegory, 
Origen works for his congregation, ultimately arriving at a spiritual sort of exhortation that 
invites the audiences’ participation and application. It is also at least partially dependent on the 
Stoic philosophical claim (or presupposition) of a spiritual reality that exists behind the 
literal/physical. Through his application of reinterpreted Stoic philosophy onto the book of 
Joshua,
82
 Origen offers his audience a Christian application to their lives, a kerygma in which 
they are invited to participate and with which they are encouraged to identify, a kerygma that can 
guide a community toward a new understanding of itself and appropriate actions from that newly 
understood identity. 
 When one considers interpreting the meaning of artwork, a variety of possibilities may 
come to mind, the most popular of which might be the untrained observer attempting to make 
sense of a piece of contemporary sculpture-work that has no hope of making sense to anybody 
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lacking a Vorverständnis of the tradition out of which it comes. When I say that the Bible can be 
taken as (literary) artwork, I do not mean that it is without connection to reality or is in some way 
enigmatic and without foundation or audience (as some contemporary sculpture-work seems to 
be). Rather, if one conceives of any good artwork as a response to an already established 
tradition, one is more likely able to make sense of the art. For example, American poetry written 
in free verse is not without its foundations in an already established poetic tradition. In the first 
half of the twentieth century, when free verse was growing increasingly popular, its most 
talented adherents had a thorough knowledge of the older and more traditional poetic forms and 
were responding to this tradition, not necessarily creating a new tradition of their own. In the 
same way, contemporary sculpture-work, while seemingly enigmatic to the uninitiated, is not 
without its foundations in traditional (and perhaps more familiar) sculpting. It is, thus, a response 
to an established tradition. 
 Understanding the Bible as part of a literary-artistic tradition should, then, be less 
uncomfortable to critics of an artistic biblical interpretation. Understanding the Bible as a work 
of art (with literature representing several centuries, all collected in a unity) is not only possible, 
but useful. Not only can we see the different literatures within the Bible responding to and 
interacting with one another, but we can track the interpretation and (more importantly) 
application of the Bible as it has been applied to the human experience in its 
Wirkungsgeschichte: Origen’s application of the story of Lazarus is an example of an 
interpreter’s application of biblical literary artwork onto a congregation’s life-experience—not 
only does Origen describe the scene that takes place in the text, he explains how this story is the 
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cause of an effect in his present, which is an interpretation thoroughly on the artistic level.
83
 That 
is, any art, should its usefulness and relevance span generations and therefore horizons, will have 
an effect on those generations interpreting it; this effect will come from an interpretation that will 
(hopefully) be in accordance with that art’s Wirkungsgeschichte, responding to the history of 
interpretation that the artwork has experienced, just as human beings respond to the social and 
cultural traditions left to them by former generations. 
 The most pressing implication, then, is that any art can be applied to one’s life, but this is 
possible only through an interpretive process that will result in application. Of course, this is not 
limited to the interpretation of the Bible, and there are arguably some key differences to keep in 
mind when considering the interpretation of that text (especially its community of interpretation 
and the goal under which it is interpreted). Artwork appeals to the creative dimension of the 
human, and it demands to be creatively and imaginatively interpreted, understood, and applied. 
Unlike methods that are subject to empirical verification, the interpretation of art (while it can 
certainly be intelligent) constructs its meaningfulness without falling subject to mathematical 
proof or the scientific method.
84
 Understanding, in this case, makes its appeal to a distinct 
dimension of human consciousness, in that we who interpret art are to recognize its powerful 
connection to ordinary life; this connection may or may not be present in the natural sciences, 
but it must be present in art and its interpretation.
85
 Furthermore, if one understands artwork as 
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capable of informing one’s life, and one considers narrative to be a work of art,86 it is possible 
for the individual to understand his/her own life as artwork and through artwork (the two 
participate in a dynamic relationship, informing one another
87—we create for ourselves dramatic 
patterns of experience we then find objectified through the artwork, patterns that are informed 
and upheld by a collection of traditions, explanations, and exhortations that are then harmonized 
within the individual’s consciousness and, finally, applied to one’s life in a meaningful and 
purposeful way.
88
 Put differently, one’s life has the possibility of becoming one’s work of art, 
and the individual is capable of deciding which artistic insights and life-applications to make 
onto his/her life that will (ultimately and necessarily) effect his/her decisions—essentially, to 
which artistic tradition one’s life will artistically respond, or which artistic objectifications will 
ultimately reveal subjective Truth to the individual interpreter. 
 This effect seems to be precisely the intent of Origen’s biblical interpretation and 
exhortation, since, through his work with the text for his community, Origen seeks to generate a 
particular way of life in his congregation, and he does so by appealing to the people’s ordinary 
way of being, showing that his message is immediately applicable to ordinary life. In other 
words, through his interpretive process, Origen uncovers a level of meaning within the biblical 
text and communicates this meaning so that its effect will be a newly-informed lifestyle. In this 
way, we see wider application becoming possible through the interpretive and explanatory 
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process of one individual, and it is through this application that Origen seeks to transform the 
lives of his hearers by the transformation of their everyday living, a level of individual 
understanding through application that signifies the opening of one’s horizons through the 
horizon-granting artistic unity of the biblical text as Origen understands it to exist. A new 
horizon is opened for the individual because of a newfound understanding and application of art 
from a past horizon.
89
 
 It is essential that we recognize how Origen achieves this inter-horizon bridge of 
understanding. Between the two parallel lines of the World of the biblical text and the World of 
Origen’s congregant and his/her everyday experience, a bridge of sorts has been constructed 
through allegorical interpretation and an understanding of the text on a symbolic level. For 
instance, read allegorically, Lazarus comes to be a symbol of sorts, standing for any of those 
hearers who once knew Christ and have died to him. Lazarus’ resurrection comes to be a symbol 
of the power of Christ to resurrect those who have died and need revitalization of their 
relationship to the Divine.
90
 These are the things that Origen chooses as applicable to one’s 
ordinary life, and it is clearly his intention that they be applied. The symbol, in this sense, cannot 
exist as a lifeless entity within the text, but it is something to which the reader/hearer/interpreter 
is to relate, not so much as a mirror in which to view the self, but as a living organism with 
which to react and relate.
91
 Put differently, one need not be in a tomb in order to feel 
symbolically dead, and it is on this level that the text relates to the reader. If art should inform the 
individual life, symbols are to be understood as a necessary part of both art and the human 
experience, since humans who are using art to inform their existence must exist (at least in some 
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part) on the symbolic (and therefore artistic) level.
92
 It is art and the creative dimension of 
language (and its many implications) that Origen uses as a bridge connecting the two Worlds; 
that is, semiotics (specifically pragmatics, symbols, and allegory) becomes the vessel through 
which application (and therefore understanding) of art from the past becomes possible for a 
congregation belonging to Origen’s present, and it is through this understanding that the 
congregation discovers the potential for the immanent possibility that their lives might have new 
meaning. Through Origen’s allegorical interpretation, the cold abstraction of scripture is 
reformed and reimagined, so that it becomes something personal: 
And thus by ascending through the individual dwellings [within the ark], one arrives at 
Noah himself, whose name means rest or righteous…Therefore, it is said of this spiritual 
Noah [Jesus] who has given rest to men and has taken away the sin of the world: “You 
shall make yourself an ark of squared planks.” Let us see, therefore, what the squared 
pegs are. That is squared which in no way sways to and fro, but in whatever way you turn 
it, it stands firm with trustworthy and solid stability. Those are the planks which bear all 
the weight either of the animals within or the floods without. I think those are the 
teachers in the Church, the leaders, and zealots of the faith who both encourage the 
people who have been placed within the Church by a word of admonition and the grace 
of the teaching, and who resist, by the power of the word and the wisdom of reason, those 
without, whether heathens or heretics, who assail the Church and stir up floods of 
questions and storms of strife.
93
 
Here, Origen’s method has led him toward constructing an interpretation resting upon the two 
inter-related fulcrums of identity and event—the very same inter-related fulcrums by which 
Origen interpreted the Joshua passage earlier; characters in Origen’s actual world, beginning 
with Jesus himself (as center of the Church), are assigned identities correspondent to all those 
who are within the ark, and the storm in the story is anthropomorphized so that it, too, can stand 
for something personal: those figuratively “outside” the Church who take aggressive attitudes 
toward it. Those who would offer safety (and participate in salvation) to those within the ark who 
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are more vulnerable (the animals) to the attack than these “squared pegs,”94 are assigned the 
identities of teachers, theologians, zealots of the faith, and so on. The detail of this identity 
assignment is quite exact and is prescribed quite thoroughly onto Origen’s context; however, 
these identity assignments would be senseless without an event present to occasion such a 
comparison. A further identity assignment, and it seems the most important, is given to the 
onslaught of the storm itself, not only as personified attack from those outside the Church, but as 
an event that occasions the construction of an ark in the first place. It would seem that this 
interpretation of the Genesis flood story is first occasioned by the distinctly personal and 
concrete situation in which the Church finds itself during the time of Origen’s interpretation. 
Without a personal and social “storm” in the actual world in which Origen lives, there would be 
no need at all to interpret the literal storm in Genesis as having anything to do with the figurative 
storm in the actual world, and to use Gadamer’s word, it is a miracle that the interpreter’s mind 
makes an association such as this, that a whole abstract unit of Scripture can be taken in its 
system and read through the experience of the interpreting community in order to produce a 
personal sense of the abstract, often drawing resourcefully from other parts of the Bible, treating 
it as a unity made to speak into the concrete and personal situations of the actual, inhabited 
world. 
 In illustration of this point, Randall Rosenberg offers a recounting of Origen’s 
interpretation of the story of Noah’s ark for a congregation of believers: 
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After describing the planks [of Noah’s ark], he surprisingly relates them to the leaders of 
the Church. He offers a sense of variation by including the cypress of Lebanon from 
Ezekiel and then turns to Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, and Paul to assert that we ought to 
depend on God alone. Finally, he brings his interpretation together by speaking of Christ 
as the spiritual Noah, architect of the Church. While there is a sense of structure, Origen’s 
manner of proceeding resembles a kind of artistic improvisation from a description of the 
attributes of a plank to several Scripture passages, and finally to Christ and the Church. 
And while more meanings can certainly be discovered in this text, Origen’s interpretation 
is consonant with Scripture as a whole and is meaningful for the faithful believer.
95
 
What the reader should first notice is Origen’s treatment of the Bible as a unity; he could easily 
take the Genesis story for what it is, but, instead, he allows different stories from the understood 
unity to inform his interpretation of the individual story, understood first as literal account, but 
second (and more importantly) as an allegory for Christ and the Church. Before this, however, 
Origen identifies the individual pieces of wood used to construct the ark (the Church) as 
symbolizing individual Church Fathers—Noah (Christ) uses individual people in the Church to 
build it up and make it worthy of holding creation. Furthermore, though an exhortation is not 
immediately evident, the general sense of the interpretation does invite participation or even 
identification with the story, understood to be both narrative of the past and (allegorically) 
happening in the present, as the spiritual ark is “now” being built. The invitation is to be a part of 
the building of this ark, or at least to identify oneself with the existence of the ark, and this is 
why Rosenberg argues the message to be relevant and meaningful to the individual believer, and 
this is why I argue the interpretation to have a pragmatic dimension: it is immediately useful and 
applicable to the hearer existing in his/her ordinary fashion. This, perhaps, is the quintessential 
example supporting my argument; in his interpretation and exhortation, Origen allegorizes the 
biblical story in an effort to make it applicable, his interpretation of key elements of the story 
function on the symbolic level (in the case of the planks) in his effort to make the story have an 
effect in his present, and his interpretation invites the application and understanding of the story 
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in a way that connects his congregation to the story while simultaneously enriching their 
everyday existence, which is its pragmatic effect. In his theological reading of the Bible, Origen 
seeks to infuse God’s existence with the existence of his congregation, opening their horizons 
through the revelation of the possibility of identification with God’s story as it is happening in 
their lives—informing their physical lives with the spiritual reality to which they are all 
connected, demonstrating both sides of the metaphorical coin.
96
 It is in this way that Patristic 
biblical exegesis may assist us in our understanding of contemporary exegesis of the artistic, a 
possibility worth exploring. Rosenberg, bringing his argument into more recent decades, 
contends that, “tradition, similar to [what we see in the philosophy of] Gadamer, plays an 
important role in facilitating this exploration of human possibility.”97 
Origen’s Allegory and Problematic Passages 
 The premise of Origen’s allegoresis was that the Bible conceals a deep philosophical 
truth relevant to the Church and world—reaching this truth is achievable only through 
allegoresis,
98
 through which (by using the person of Christ as the interpretive key) Origen arrives 
at a truth into which his audience of catechumens can live, meaning he provides them with a 
mysterious way in which to participate in the gospel that seems to be valid at least for the time in 
which he discovers it. One must not forget that Origen is interpreting contextual biblical 
literature for a context of his own, just as contemporary societies interpret their literatures from 
their own standpoint within a historical framework. Therefore, it is worth drawing attention to 
the reality that Origen, as we too are likely to do, ran into problematic passages that (even if they 
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are not problematic for us) gave him pause; yet, he is able to make sense of these passages, 
concluding that they must and do have a purpose and can be understood as “saving.” As 
influenced as he (and arguably his community) was by Stoic philosophy and Neo-Platonism, one 
can expect Origen’s commentary on potentially problematic passages of Scripture to reflect his 
hermeneutical presuppositions, just as we can expect our own hermeneutical presuppositions to 
influence our readings of texts relevant to our horizons and World. 
In his Commentary on the Gospel According to John,
99
 Origen uses allegorical 
interpretation to explain Jesus’ tears at Lazarus’ death and the fact that Jesus (understood as the 
divine Logos) asked where the body might be; it is argued to be inappropriate for a Stoic sage 
(Jesus included, it seems) to succumb to grief as Jesus so clearly does, and it is also unacceptable 
that the divine Logos should be without perfect knowledge of all things, as has been helpfully 
highlighted: 
Origen comments on Jesus’ request to know where the mourning Jews have placed 
Lazarus…Of course, the heavenly λόγος cannot be without this knowledge, Origen 
states; consequently, the Savior’s question must be interpreted allegorically. The request 
should be understood as a divine command concerning the disciples’ relation to their own 
mortal bodies: they themselves are to leave their corpses behind. Origen, somewhat 
enigmatically, explains, “If anyone ignores that he belongs to God, he will be ignored 
himself.”100 
As Jesus’ lack of knowledge on the literal level of the text proves problematic for Origen’s 
understanding of the way in which the world works, he works from this problem to another level 
of meaning, a level he gives priority of meaning, as he (ultimately) draws his exhortation from 
his allegorical interpretation of the text. The word used earlier for Lazarus’ illness is ἀ σθενεία, 
which, consequently, was the word chosen by Stoic philosophers not only for debilitating illness 
                                                 
 
99
 Origen, Commentary on the Gospel According to John, 292-302. 
100
 Tuomas Rasimus, Troels Engberg-Pedersen and Ismo Dunderberg, Stoicism in Early Christianity 
(Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010): 98. 
Weinzierl 56 
 
but also for moral weakness; this arguably gives Origen some interpretive justification as he 
exhorts his congregation through the text.
101
 Whether or not his argument is convincing to an 
audience of contemporary interlocutors is irrelevant to my argument. The point is, in a manner 
that is congruent with his contextual presuppositions, Origen is able to read a text that (probably) 
made perfect sense in the past but no longer does on some level, reinterpret it so that it does 
make sense for the present, and conclude his interpretation with an exhortation based on (but 
certainly not limited to) the literal sense of the text. His exhortation relies on the literal sense as a 
foundation but is much more dependent on the allegorical sense he gleans from the text that is 
more likely to make sense to his historically conditioned audience. 
 In the same way (and in the same passage), Origen, finding the textual reality of Jesus’ 
tears problematic, reinterprets the scene as saying something other than the literal, since Jesus 
crying was not in accordance with the ideal of Hellenistic moral philosophy.
102
 The word for 
Jesus’ weeping (or shedding tears) is δακρύω, which Origen does not interpret as Jesus bursting 
into uncontrollable weeping, although it could absolutely and very easily mean that. Rather, 
Origen prefers to interpret this word as the involuntary and natural human reaction that comes 
before weeping—to “begin to cry” is thus understood differently from being unable to control 
one’s emotions of grief, and this is crucial for Origen’s understanding of the passage.103 Though 
this is certainly interpretation, it is hardly allegoresis; Origen does, however, avoid a problematic 
reading of the text for his context. One should also note that, even though Origen does avoid the 
notion that Jesus might have succumbed to grief, there is no exhortation that is paired with this 
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reinterpretation, suggesting that, if the passage is to be applied (and it shall be), it must be taken 
within a system larger than itself. Still, this is a decent example of Origen’s reinterpreting a text 
for his time without employing allegoresis, implying that reinterpretation on the literal level 
alone is possible in itself without the use of allegoresis and, thereby, moving up the interpretive 
ladder to the next level of biblical interpretation. 
 Origen reinterprets problematic passages on both the literal and allegorical level, as I 
have demonstrated, but he is always careful to end any interpretive system with an exhortation, 
inviting his audience to apply his interpretation to their existence. His interpretation of Lazarus’ 
death and resurrection is no exception: 
Origen summarizes his exegesis of Lazarus’s death by drawing an exhortative 
conclusion: “Now, we ought to be aware that there are some Lazaruses even now who, 
after they have become Jesus’ friends, have become sick and died, and as dead persons 
they have remained in the tomb and the land of the dead with the dead.”104 
Through his application of allegoresis and reinterpretation to this passage, Origen has taken 
something presented to his context that is absolutely unacceptable (that Jesus would have been 
without knowledge or would have been unable to control his emotions—both are qualities we 
might find less problematic today), and he has reworked and reimagined these into something 
both grounded in the text and acceptable in his contextual community of interpretation. Not 
stopping there, he has turned his allegory into exhortation, thereby offering his audience a 
kerygma in which to participate. It is necessary for him that the references the text is making on 
a literal level not impede him in his allegorical interpretation toward appropriate text mimesis 
that is to be reflected in his community and society.
105
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Kerygma and the Uniqueness of the Christian Gospel and Biblical Interpretation 
 Biblical hermeneutics, then, is closely related to the hermeneutics of any classical or 
ancient text, though arguably distinct from it when being done within an ecclesial context.
106
 
Understanding ancient art, philosophy, or any of the ancient Geisteswissenschaften does not 
require timeless identification with a historical and temporal stand point, but a historical 
participation with a Truth that is historical itself—in this way, the Truth is understood only by 
those who participate in it,
107
 which is exactly the goal of Origen’s interpretation and exhortation 
to his congregants. His allegoresis of biblical stories seek to, yes, illumine the truth behind them, 
but, as we have seen, they also go to explain the reality of the literal. Through this, Origen’s goal 
of reaching the theological Truth behind the words of Scripture is completed only when he offers 
his congregation a Truth in which they are invited to participate. The Truth communicated by 
any art is and must remain fundamentally historical; however, it is possible for Truth to 
transcend history through the interpretation and reinterpretation of that art (according the 
consciousness of the historically conditioned interpreter). In other words, the literal or physical 
level of a Truth (which is the artistic objectification of a Truth) is rooted in history, but its ability 
to speak across Worlds requires a level of reinterpretation and re-appropriation of the intended 
effect. This is true even and especially of Stoic philosophy as it applies to the interpretation of 
ancient literature. When the Stoics emerged, their communities held certain presuppositions that 
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were common in their World (i.e., that Zeus was the creator of humanity) that are uncommon (or 
even unheard of) in our World. Although we assume them to be either incorrect or misguided in 
their premises, it would be an insult to the Stoics (and a disservice to ourselves) to disregard their 
method and conclusions entirely based on their historically conditioned premises. According to 
William Irvine, this separation does not imply that the Stoic “good life” is inaccessible to us; it 
does mean that, in order for the Stoic good life to be possible, a re-examination of sociological 
premises becomes necessary. That is, Irvine is able to reinterpret Stoicism for a contemporary 
audience with different presuppositions so that the philosophy might have a similar effect now as 
it did in the past.
108
 In this same way, it seems that Origen’s actions would indicate (and that 
Gadamer’s argument states) that the Christian life is possible across Worlds, just as Irvine argues 
that Stoicism is. Different Worlds will assume different things, but the pragmatic effect of a 
Truth, when appropriately reinterpreted, will be (in a sense) timeless. 
The function of the symbol in art is to inspire reflection in the individual. One sees the 
physical object and imagines that it stands for something else, ideally and probably something 
less physical. The idea is that the physical objectification of an otherwise incommunicable idea is 
made possible through the intelligent and creative production of art. The artistic interpreter is 
creative and intelligent, as well, but the goal here is to work from the physical symbol, the 
objectification of the ineffable, to the incommunicable idea that is represented. Thus, if a work of 
art is to have its full effect, it must be experienced by the interpreter. Through the individual’s 
experience with the symbolic, the symbol in artwork reveals Truth to the interpreter without 
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containing Truth in the objectification itself.
109
  Similarly, allegorical interpretation of the artistic 
creates this unity of literal story and spiritual reality by interpreting the literal story as pointing to 
something beyond itself—through allegorical interpretation of a story, the interpreter is able to 
recognize the literal history/physical object as valid while understanding this history/object to 
speak into his/her life. That is, s/he will recognize the story as “other,” but s/he cannot be limited 
by the “otherness” of the literal, and the ancient story is thus empowered to have its effect in the 
present.
110
 This is the pragmatic effect of allegory and symbol that is, indeed, miraculous (to use 
Gadamer’s word).111 The power of the historically conditioned story to reach over chasms and 
exist as bridge between Worlds implies that the interpreted story becomes transcendent. 
 Gadamer says, however, that allegory and allegorical interpretation (at least in the 
twentieth century) have waned in their popularity, and he argues for a rehabilitation of allegory 
when interpreting the artistic and for recognition of its value for the reflective individual and 
community.
112
 Combining the value of the experience of the artwork with the necessarily 
historically conditioned individual consciousness, Gadamer sees the transcendental nature of 
artwork as recognizable only through an appropriate application of allegorical interpretation and 
healthy relationship to the symbolic. That is, symbol, allegory, and pragmatism aid one another 
in allowing the individual to discover hidden Truth in artwork, and applying that Truth to his/her 
individual life, which is essential to understanding. Thus, we can conclude that understanding 
artwork of a past horizon may not be possible without the appropriate use of semiotics: one 
World understanding a second World is not possible without the assistance of certain semiotic 
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devices—literary-artistic tools such as the symbolic. Indeed, if the value of allegory has declined 
in this present age, a proper understanding of texts from horizons more appreciative of allegory 
than our own cannot exist without an appreciation (or at least understanding) of that horizon’s 
value of allegory and its usefulness in artistic expression.
113
 
 Allegory, in Gadamer’s estimation (as I have already drawn attention to), not only draws 
the reader into a kerygma, but informs the meaning of the literal: the allegory allows for the 
interpreter to see that the literal stands for something other than what it literally is; that is, the 
literal story is read differently when Truth is revealed through allegory. In other words (and very 
similar to popular Stoic allegorical theory), allegory reveals a hidden truth behind the text, and 
just as this “other side of the coin” is revealed, the interpreter uses this newfound knowledge to 
inform his/her understanding of the first (literal) side of the coin, so the two sides are understood 
to not only be intimately connected through allegory, but in dynamic conversation with one 
another and the interpreter.  Extrapolating this idea, Gadamer argues that the process of 
(allegorical) interaction with the artistic not only informs the interpreter of the horizon out of 
which the art comes, but it also necessitates a development of self-understanding: as a new 
horizon is discovered, the interpreter engages in a transactional relationship in which s/he is 
informed of both horizons that are in this dynamic conversation.
114
 Through conversation, the 
interpreter discovers that “otherness” does not necessarily imply “alien,” as the Truth of artwork 
of a different World is heard for what it claims to be, reinterpreted for a different context, and 
finally applied and understood, the Truth at which it aims becomes transcendent, even while the 
history out of which it comes does not. In this reinterpretation, one becomes aware of his/her 
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own context and how this discovered Truth might become applicable for humans in the 
interpreter’s context, which sounds like what Origen accomplished with his reinterpretation of 
Noah’s ark, suggesting that his hermeneutic and exhortative process may have some relevance to 
the modern hermeneutical debate.
115
 Beyond this, it may prove itself useful to consider methods 
of Patristic biblical interpretation, especially Origen’s, as potential resources for methods of 
contemporary literary criticism. 
 Contemporary literary communities do not (and cannot afford to) consider literature from 
other horizons as somehow fundamentally disconnected from the contemporary world; rather, all 
literature produced today exists only by virtue of the literature of the past, as a response to the 
established tradition, as Gadamer argues: 
Literature does not exist as a dead remnant of an alienated being, left over for a later time 
as simultaneous with its experiential reality. Literature is a function of being 
intellectually preserved and handed on, and therefore brings its hidden history into every 
age. Beginning with the establishment of the canon of classical literature by the 
Alexandrian philologists, copying and preserving the “classics” is a living cultural 
tradition that does not simply preserve what exists but acknowledges it as a model and 
passes it on as an example to be followed.
116
 
(The best) Literary artwork is the most intelligent utterances of a World’s imagination of what is 
and what might be possible—literature (as a form of art) represents the very extent of a horizon’s 
imagination, and, when a second horizon reads and interprets the literature of the first 
(recognizing it as something human, understandable and, therefore, applicable), it transforms the 
ancient literature into something able to have an effect in the present. That is, interpretation 
grants ancient texts validity in the present—something once alien and other becomes something 
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familiar and intimate.
117
 By bringing ancient literature into the present through interpretation, a 
bridge is established connecting two otherwise parallel lines (that, otherwise, never would have 
met); that is, artistic interpretation (and the symbol and allegory that accompany it) is the bridge 
spanning human existence and consciousness, allowing understanding through dynamic 
conversation. To Gadamer, this is precisely how the Christian Gospel is to function, except that 
the Gospel is distinct from other artwork in a very important way. 
 Gadamer understands that the Bible, being the Church’s sacred book, has been constantly 
read by representatives of the Church, which is not necessarily to be considered a bad thing; 
however, if the Bible’s meaning is dogmatically determined at a point in history and is 
understood to be fixed and immovable for all time, this will hinder the relationship between a 
culture and the text; rather, the text that is part of a tradition of interpretation (a text that has a 
community of interpretation) will be constantly read and reread, even dogmatically.
118
 The 
Church and the culture to which it relates both move in history, but, if the interpretation of the 
Bible is historically fixed, the text ceases to be a dialogue partner in dynamic conversation, and it 
becomes a hopelessly historical artifact of sorts, a dead remnant of past culture. It is imperative 
that the text’s contemporary interpretation be informed by (without being limited by) the text’s 
Wirkungsgeschichte; in other words, the text and its interpretation will move with culture 
through history, like any other text. However, the difference between the interpretation of 
literature and the ecclesial interpretation of Scripture here is that the Church’s interpretation of 
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the Bible must be understood as kerygmatic—literary interpretation has the option of being non-
kerygmatic, but the gospel cannot be so understood, as Gadamer says: 
The gospel does not exist in order to be understood as a merely historical document, but 
to be taken in such a way that it exercises its saving effect. This implies that the text, 
whether law or gospel, if it is to be understood properly—i.e., according to the claim it 
makes—must be understood at every moment, in every concrete situation, in a new and 
different way. Understanding here is always application.
119
 
No ecclesial biblical interpretation coming from within the church, according to Gadamer, 
should overlook the ecclesial claim that the Bible is a word from God, and its interpretation will 
take priority over doctrines developed in the past that may or may not be valid within a newer 
generation or interpretation—indeed, it may be possible that the doctrines themselves would need 
(re)interpretation. Any biblical interpretation, therefore, must not neglect the divine proclamation 
of salvation, whether it reaches this proclamation (or kerygma) through allegoresis or not.
120
 
Relatedly, Origen’s Christocentric biblical lens caused him to read the text through, not his 
Christology, but his Soteriology; that is, Origen interpreted the Bible through his understanding 
of salvation, and he exhorted his congregation so that the gospel of salvation could be heard and 
applied to their lives—application being essential to the congregation’s understanding of the 
Scripture being explained. One can’t help but notice how similar these two great thinkers sound, 
though Worlds apart. For both thinkers, the Bible exists as a means of kerygmatic exhortation. 
The use of allegory toward this end is, not only permissible, but appropriate and expected. I, 
therefore, argue that any present debate over biblical hermeneutics that is inclusive of Gadamer 
cannot afford to disregard Patristic biblical interpretation, especially that of Origen, as these two 
seem to be in almost intentional conversation with one another. Of course, one could argue that 
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this is what the Church has been doing for centuries, but it seems that the Church would do well 
to pay attention to Patristic exegesis.
121
 
 The Christian gospel, therefore, is unique among all other artwork, in that its interpretive 
community (the Church) must adhere to a divine command of sorts: interpreting the gospel in 
such a way that it is accessible and applicable to the culture in which it is interpreted for the goal 
of salvation of the individual,
122
 which is where we find the pragmatic roots of this system. 
Symbol and allegory are, of course, fundamental here, as they are widely and easily accessible 
and are capable of bridging the chasm of time.
123
 The point of ecclesial biblical interpretation, 
according to both Origen and Gadamer, seems to be supplying culture with a kerygmatic 
understanding of faith—a gospel in which to participate, which I think is correct; however, this 
should not be the end of our understanding of kerygma. If this criticism is to utilize artistic 
interpretation as that which undergirds it (and if this kerygmatic hermeneutic has merit), it 
follows that there must be dynamic implications for other artistic interpretation, as well. 
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3. Fiction and Ethics: Systems and the Connection of Worlds 
Reference, Mimesis, and Meaning: Clarence Walhout on Truth and Fiction 
 Thus far, I have been utilizing the terminology “reference” and “mimesis” to refer, to a 
conceptual link made between the implied world of the text and the actual world of the reader. 
“Reference” refers to the words, characters, items, ideas, and so on within the particular 
imagined world of a given text, while, on the other hand, “mimesis” has referred to whatever 
there is in the world of the reader to which the reference is imagined to correspond. This 
relationship is, of course, complex and conditioned/influenced by the reader’s position in history 
as well as his/her system of values and location within society. I’ve taken this terminology from 
Clarence Walhout, who does a phenomenal job explicating exactly what this language is to 
indicate, using Adventures of Huckleberry Finn as an example (which may be considered a 
culturally relevant text):  
We may say that the snake in Huckleberry Finn is the one that bit Jim and that the word 
snake in the novel refers to or designates that particular snake. We can do this without 
having to raise the issue of this snake’s relation to real snakes in the actual world. (This 
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relation is what we will subsequently treat as an issue of mimesis rather than of 
reference.)
124
 
Walhout’s only assertion here that I might challenge is his indication that it is possible to talk 
about a particular snake to which a text makes reference without having to raise the issue of a 
snake or snakes in the actual world. While it is true that the discussion of the referenced textual 
snake need not be a discussion of a snake in the actual world, it is also true that the reader would 
know the referenced snake only by her/his experience with snakes in the actual world, which is 
consistent with Gadamer’s notion of knowing and experiencing art only through our position in 
the world and in light of our own concerns. It seems fairly safe to assume that the reader would 
first imagine the referenced snake to be at least similar to a snake experienced in the actual 
world, unless the text suggests that s/he do otherwise, and it seems here that it does not. The 
“snake” in Genesis 3 is a good example in which the referential language is quite clear, though 
what this particular snake stands for is perhaps less clear, as it has been taken to mean a literal 
snake, the devil, some unnamed tempter, etc. The influence of these interpretive leaps 
concerning the Genesis 3 snake have been many, and their social effects great. 
Beyond this, Walhout argues further that reference is not limited to textual worlds, but 
rather transcends them; language in general has reference insofar as it is descriptive within a 
certain sphere of imagination: Huck Finn, for instance, has a certain descriptive quality for those 
of us who have a pre-understanding concerning Huck Finn and what this term references, even if 
we are not necessarily making any claims about what the referential description of Huck Finn 
stands for in a broader and more general sense—we can, in other words, at least talk about Huck 
Finn, the character of Mark Twain, without discussing what he stands for as a character.
125
 Here, 
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Walhout seems to be drawing a distinction between descriptive language concerning the actual 
world and metaphorical language concerning the actual world, and, while a distinction seems 
prudent (or even obvious), we may find that the distinction often becomes murky, at best, when 
concerning interpretation. Whatever the case, it is clear that referential or descriptive language 
exists in both textual spheres and within the spheres of the actual world of human experience. 
Walhout continues: 
The language of a novel descriptively refers to or designates the fictional objects and 
states of affairs that the author picks out or projects by means of the language. We may 
regard these objects and states of affairs as constituting the world of the novel. As long as 
we limit our concern to the descriptive references of the novel’s language, we are only 
surveying or mapping out its fictional world, that is, seeing clearly the states of affairs 
that are being descriptively pointed out. For example, the language of Huckleberry Finn 
refers descriptively to the states of affairs in which Huck Finn finds himself in Mark 
Twain’s novel. Our concern with reference is a concern only with an accurate 
understanding of what these states of affairs are.
126
 
As long as the reader’s attention is left in the narrow world of description and reference 
according to the world of the text, Walhout is arguing, not only that there need be no mention of 
meaning beyond that referential sphere, but that there can be no meaning beyond that sphere, 
which seems obvious enough. Even if describing the state of affairs in Huck Finn without 
considering the novel (or any discussed text) in light of our own concerns is possible, this narrow 
task will leave no room for the encounter that is necessary in order for the “Fusion of horizons” 
to occur between reader and text, which Gadamer considers hermeneutically necessary. 
However, Walhout is not arguing that this ought to be the end of a hermeneutical journey, only 
that this is an elementary step in the hermeneutical process. “Mapping out” the textual language 
and landscape outside of our own world of experience is an acceptable point at which to begin an 
interpretive process, but again, to raise my prior criticism, the textual world is known only by 
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virtue of the actual world of the reader. It is impossible for the states of affairs within Huck Finn 
to be understood in a vacuum. Therefore, understanding descriptive language in any case (textual 
or otherwise) will begin with a historical-socially conditioned pre-understanding of how the 
world works in the first place, and this will serve as a frame of reference for Walhout’s 
“Mapping Out” process. 
 If referential language is merely descriptive and is meant to carry no greater weight than 
that, Walhout is correct in implying that there is an enormous piece of the interpretive process 
still missing, and he uses the term “mimesis” to categorize the remaining portion of the 
interpretive process,
127
 and, compared to the descriptive sphere of reference, the idea of mimesis 
is quite a bit more complicated, given that even the most familiar description will undoubtedly be 
the cause of certain questions about the actual world of human experience: the snake in Huck 
Finn, for example, if understood in a descriptively positive way, may lead the reader to question 
the role of snakes in the actual world, if the reader has viewed snakes in a negative way thus far. 
Conversely, it may lead the reader to question the text’s interpreted portrayal of snakes as 
positive, if this runs counter to his/her experience. This, of course, is an example on a small and 
elementary scale, and questions of greater importance coming out of Huck Finn are sure to 
present themselves—most notably are, of course, the delicate conceptual dynamics of slavery 
and freedom in the United States, the interrelatedness of persons of different races within 
America, and many more questions that continue to make this novel culturally relevant. 
These subsequent questions involve the ways in which the fictional world of the text is 
related to the actual world of authors and readers, and these are questions of mimesis. I 
am proposing, then, that the term reference be used to indicate the relationship of the 
language of the text to the world that is projected by the language, and that the word 
mimesis be used to indicate the relationship of the fictional world projected by the text to 
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the actual world that we inhabit… While the two concepts are interrelated, they are also 
distinct and can be examined independently.
128
 
Walhout calls the relationship between reference and mimesis interrelated, but I would challenge 
him here; of course, he is correct, but I do not think he goes quite far enough. I should like to 
characterize the relationship between reference and mimesis as, not interrelated, but 
interdependent: referential description seems pointless without the possibility of mimetic action, 
and description implies relationship to begin with, and mimesis is not generated without 
reference first coming into being. Although these concepts are intimately related and dependent 
upon one another, I do think Walhout is correct in his assessment that either concept can be 
examined independently of the other as long as it is understood that neither concept can exist 
without the other also existing, to add a further stipulation to his explication.
129
 
 The dynamics of this concept of “mimesis” are, as I said earlier, far more complex than 
the dynamics of text reference and descriptive language, because within the sphere of mimesis 
lies, not only 1) the correspondences and correlations the reader interprets the descriptive 
language to share with the actual world, but also 2) the actions that this descriptive language 
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inspires in the reader as a result of her/his interpretation.
130
 First, there is this two-fold sense of 
mimesis. Beyond this, there is the complexity and delicate nuance of how meaning is assigned at 
all. Within Walhout’s concept of mimesis, we may see that there is a correlation of sorts between 
this notion and Gadamer’s notion of a hermeneutical relationship between worlds resulting in a 
fusion of horizons. In order for a fusion of horizons to take place, however, understanding must 
exist between one horizon and at least one other; the social world of the reader must be related to 
the social world of the “Other.” Understanding (in Gadamer’s mind, at least) is completed, not in 
the assigning of identity and the correspondence of textual reference to entities in the actual 
world, but the Anwendung, or application, that a person’s actual world of experience receives 
when the understanding of another horizon’s text or artwork is actualized in the mind of the 
interpreting reader.
131
 Mimesis, then, includes this all-important Anwendung particle and allows 
for the actualization of the text: 
Mimesis is concerned with the relations among worlds rather than with a determinate 
understanding of the actual world. How we construe this mimetic relationship in the case 
of a particular text depends, of course, on our theories about reality and the actual world, 
but the concept of mimesis is not itself thereby under attack. Our interpretation of the 
mimetic relation of particular narratives to the actual world will vary according to our 
understandings of the actual world, but the mimetic relation persists irrespective of our 
conceptions of the actual world.
132
 
Here, Walhout is essentially stating that mimesis will not diminish, regardless of how the reader 
perceives himself/herself to interact with the world socially or otherwise. That is, mimesis will 
remain, no matter the social location of the reader; however, this bare fact does not take primacy 
over the reality of mimesis as event. Put differently, mimesis is essentially concrete, personal, 
and experiential; it cannot be understood as an abstraction, though it may be thought of as a 
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personal response that proceeds from an abstract transaction.  Mimesis, sometimes called 
centrifugal meaning, is therefore defined not only by its existence in relationship to its referential 
counterpart, or its centripetal meaning, but more importantly by its interpretive fabric in the 
actual world: its human-experiential element.
133
 Meaning cannot be understood as centrifugal 
without the realization of a potential effect on the world of the reader: identity (re)assignment, 
priority recognition, ethical admonition, aesthetic revelation, etc. These things, among others, 
participate in application; that is, they are significant insofar as they generate meaning through 
correspondence and application, which will be appropriate or inappropriate depending on a 
person’s stance/location in the World. One’s experience with the world will participate in 
determining that person’s pre-understanding of where value is, what things are honorable, which 
identities are desirable, etc. Whatever patterns exist in the world of the reader will be brought to 
the world of the text and, through a dynamic relationship (including mimesis) with that text, a 
reader will have her/his horizon fused with the horizon of an “Other” and will thus be 
transformed into a new individual whose recognition of pattern in the world has been influenced 
by worldview of another—and these mimetic concepts cannot be understood apart from the 
human experience with them, regardless of whether or not mimesis is diminished persistently 
apart from the reader’s perception of the world.134 
Fiction, Ethics, and the Social-Communal Function of Mimesis 
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On individual levels (or even communal levels), the textual concepts of descriptive 
reference and mimetic action seem like plausible and reasonable theorizations based on 
observation and good critical thinking, but there is a further concept that permeates the 
discussion of this topic in the first place. Thus far, I have been (rather freely) using the phrase- 
term “culturally relevant” in regards to the text being interpreted, and I do mean to be textually-
selective, in a sense. I am being “selective” in my use of the term insofar as “cultural-relevance” 
would not apply to the lesser-known writers of history, though this would have nothing to do 
with the quality of these writers’ work. Rather, it has to do with how prolific (or not) a writer is 
and how well s/he is received by the general public in his/her time or the generations following 
him/her who have had time to reflect on the text s/he produced. For instance, thus far, I have 
made mention of Shakespeare (who would apply to most of the English-speaking world) and of 
Mark Twain (who would apply to American audiences, in particular), and I have also made 
reference to the Christian Bible as it applies to the community that has (and still today) considers 
it a relevant text for reflection and praise, among other things in a more religious setting, 
perhaps. In a broader sense, Mark Twain’s Adventures of Huckleberry Finn is taught literature at 
most American colleges and universities (and high schools, for that matter), as are many of 
Shakespeare’s plays and sonnets. The question must be asked, if the concepts of reference and 
mimesis are to frame the discussion: what makes these pieces of literature worthy of being 
chosen out of the wide breadth of literature already existing (by whatever power is capable of 
choosing), to be taught as literature to bright young minds in classrooms across the nation. 
Indeed, what could it be about Mark Twain, for example, that makes his text about a river trip on 
a raft so special that it is taught to almost every American with an education including some 
instruction in the humanities? Furthermore, and especially in reference to the conversation 
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between Origen and Gadamer, what is it about the Christian gospel and its relation to the Church 
that makes it worthy of sustaining as a piece of text worthy of being taught? These texts (all of 
them works of art) surely reveal something (that is, some Truth) about human being that those 
who teach and assign them have found profoundly valuable and worthy of development in those 
who would belong to the community; however, the dynamics of this text-authority-reader 
relationship are quite complicated and varied, and it requires some explication, especially in its 
relationship to the concept of mimetic action, which will function differently depending on the 
interpreting community. 
In a broader sense, still (and to make a probably-safe generalization), it seems 
acknowledged, even across disciplines, that there exists some rule or marker of worth capable of 
distinguishing a certain work of literature from its contemporaries—one work of art over another 
work of art produced around the same time. Whatever ubiquitous yet ambiguous social power it 
is that grants certain “writing” its inclusion into the more prestigious category of “literature,” we 
can say with certainty that a literary canon (in some capacity, whether codified, mythological, or 
anywhere in between) exists in our society and that most literature that is “taught” is drawn from 
this canon.
135
 It is important to note that the paradox inherent in this model of instruction lies in 
the nature of the canonical literature itself—the message(s) of some literature, if treated fairly, 
has the potential to be interpreted as culturally-critical or counter-cultural, especially in the case 
of popular American literature;
136
 therefore, it could be said that the assigning or teaching culture 
is assigning and teaching literature that is critical of the body assigning it, or so it would seem. 
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Allow me to suggest, however, that it is not the culture per se that is assigning these works, but a 
smaller “assigning community” within the culture, comprised of individuals sharing similar 
values (corresponding to the social location from which they come). In illustration of this, an 
assigning community might value a certain type of social criticism, considering it a virtue worthy 
of development in the learning communities under its power. This, of course, is meant to imply 
that any literature that is socially critical might be eligible for adoption into that “taught” body of 
literature, regardless of whether or not the literature is written by a member of that community or 
not.
137
 Furthermore, any literature narrating a communally relevant attempt to understand the 
world
138
 (developing a socially and communally-grounded worldview) is especially useful in the 
development of, not societies in a very generalized sense (that is, not “Americans,” but rather a 
smaller community of people who are part of the fabric of a more general “America”), but the 
individuals that comprise societies, a relatively more desirable scenario. For this reason, I find it 
reasonable to suggest that the assigning community or communities that established the “current” 
canon of American fiction (necessarily located within that culture) established a canon of 
literature thematically correspondent to the virtues they themselves deem worthy of 
development. Specifically, narrators, protagonists, or other main characters will almost certainly 
be worthy of examination/reference, might be worthy of imitation/mimesis (or its opposite), but 
are rarely worthy of duplication (or its opposite). In this same way, those who establish any 
canon of taught literature choose literature that they see as correspondent to the values, virtues, 
and social action they deem appropriate. This would apply, not just to American fiction and its 
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teachers/assigners, of course, but to any community that includes the teaching and examination 
of a text they see as “culturally relevant” and as a valuable revealer of human being. 
 It seems the cornerstone of the practice of virtue ethics has always (and necessarily) been 
figures (or a single figure) whose character a community finds worthy of reflection. However, 
obviously, in order to deem any character worthy of this demanding responsibility, an assigning 
community must first examine the character in his/her fullness. Perhaps any character with 
whom an audience is familiar should be examined for a moral/ethical purpose: in the New 
Testament, for example, Abraham is used as an example of righteousness several times—of 
course, because he was the “most righteous,” but also because everybody (at the time) knew 
about Abraham as an example of righteousness—that is, it would be ineffective (and odd) to 
reference a righteous figure unknown to an audience. In the same way, the Homeric figures of 
Odysseus, Achilles, Nestor, and so on were constantly the focus of the interpretations of ancient 
Stoic philosophers: teachers of metaphysics, ethics, and so on, making Homer an early kind of 
required reading (or culturally-relevant literature). In American contexts, the cornerstone of 
American fiction is often said to be Adventures of Huckleberry Finn; even if this is not the 
case,
139
 it is at least understood to be a generally accepted assumption.  One could argue that the 
character Huck, like the Homeric character Odysseus, exists outside the boundaries of the typical 
human existence and is, therefore, subjective in his views and understandings in a way entirely 
Other than the audiences who are examining him.
140
 An examination of his judgments could, 
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then (according to Gadamer’s view of human Truth as emerging out of dynamic conversation 
with the Other), lead a reader to another understanding of the reality of the human condition—
this reality as it is presented in the novel—which is an understanding useful in itself. Beyond 
this, however, the worth we glean from this examination finds its full manifestation in its 
application onto our own culture, or the mimesis readers experience after examining the 
descriptive language. As Huck examines and judges from a place of Otherness, so too is the 
reader led by the novel (and perhaps by those who assign it) to judge society through fresher 
eyes: through the eyes of the one who is wholly Other and therefore distinct from the reader, the 
one who is able to criticize society from outside the boundaries of society (a quality that was 
called worthy of development far before postmodernism). In summary, through an examination 
of Huck’s character, the reader observes the tools with which s/he might examine his/her own 
context. If the assigning community wishes to keep Adventures of Huckleberry Finn in their 
“taught literature” arsenal, the community must first agree that this critical inclination is a 
desirable virtue, worthy of development in those who will perpetuate our own contexts.  
Though Huck may certainly be worthy of imitation, the next category goes a bit farther 
than the first and is slightly more complicated, so Huck’s inclusion or exclusion should not be 
assumed. While examination of descriptive language in the novel is certainly a less dangerous 
approach to understanding a character’s action/position, imitation and mimesis imply that these 
actions and/or positions are judged morally/ethically good, sound, or in some way worthy and 
should therefore be reflected in the reader as they are drawn from the text, similar to Origen’s 
examination and exhortation concerning the death and resuscitation of Lazarus, for example. Of 
course, it should be made clear that mimesis is distinct from duplication of action: if people read 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn and decide that it might be a good decision to raft down the 
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nearest river, this is a poor societal development. Mimesis is a bit more nuanced and is meant in 
the sense that it first requires intelligent examination of descriptive language toward an 
understanding of the textual world as it is being communicated to the reader; only after a reader 
understands a character in her/his context can s/he know if that character is worthy of mimesis, 
or if there is any quality the character possesses that should be imitated at all in the context of the 
actual world of the reader. We have a different horizon than Mark Twain and live in a different 
world; thus, we will understand Jim and Huck’s relationship differently than Twain’s immediate 
audience: we have different assumptions and concerns about race and homosexuality, for 
example.
141
 Although the authorial stance comes from an entirely different horizon and social 
World than that of the contemporary interpreter, there is nothing to suggest that this text should 
be silent on issues outside its own scope as literature. The text may have been written in light of 
the particular concerns of one horizon, but it can absolutely be interpreted in light of other 
concerns that correspond to other horizons—these interpretations and their significances will all 
contribute to the Wirkungsgeschichte of the assigned, authoritative text (in this instance, 
Adventures of Huckleberry Finn). 
The assigning community, in its selection of what literature is worthy of inclusion in the 
“taught literature” category, makes a subtle argument within its context, an argument that (first) 
there are characters worthy of imitation (or, in some cases, anti-imitation), and (second) that 
those characters are presented in the canonical texts. For example, The Catcher in Rye’s hero, 
Holden Caufield, much like Huck Finn, is an outsider (and Other) trying to make sense of the 
world. This, in itself, might be a virtue worthy of development; however, unlike Huck, Holden 
develops his own worldview in which he exists, troubled and disillusioned, between two 
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extremes and opposites: the “nice” and the “phony.”142 This dualist sort of approach to 
understanding the world is ancient in origin and, if teased out to its full expression, it may be 
fundamentally flawed.
143
 Nevertheless, an examination of Holden’s character as the text presents 
it will lead a reader to see him developing a worldview of his own that is located in the culture 
out of which he comes, a worldview distinct and isolated from his culture. This means that it is 
not Holden’s dualist worldview that is worthy of imitation; rather, it is either the act of creating 
one’s own way of viewing and being in the world, which is so necessary in becoming an 
individual, or relating one’s already existing worldview to the worldview of the wholly Other—
which was the case with Huck Finn. In its including The Catcher in the Rye in the canon, the 
assigning community is making the argument that self-creation and self-definition, when they are 
accomplished in conversation with those outside the boundaries of normal and/or normative 
social existence, are virtues worthy of imitation, a mimetic dialogue that society needs in order to 
change and perpetuate itself through time. As Holden’s worldview is gradually realized, so too 
does the assigning community quietly exhort the reading community to mimic Holden in his 
revelation, discovering his/her own worldview through dialogue with the “Otherness” presented 
by the assigned text. 
 It is, therefore, not the general culture itself that assigns literature to be read by that same 
general culture, but an assigning community located within that culture, meaning literature that is 
deemed canonical and is subsequently taught (to either the entire population or a smaller portion 
of it) is literature selected by a group consisting of only a few individual assigners. Therefore, the 
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positions, worldviews, presuppositions, social locations, and even personal histories of the 
individual assigners will contribute in the determination of canon status (and literature’s 
inclusion in the canon) as time progresses. In illustration, if assigners are mostly white Protestant 
men, the “taught” authors will not necessarily be white, Protestant men, but the ethical 
implications of the taught literature’s interpretation will most likely correspond to the ethical 
presuppositions of the assigning community, in this case, white and Protestant and male. As the 
assigning community grows in its diversity, like the culture and its writings already have, we can 
certainly expect the canon to reflect a wider diversity of social locations, cultural histories, and 
ethical presuppositions. For example, Jack Kerouac’s On The Road seems to value radical 
human freedom above most things; this means freedom even from the culture in which a reader 
finds him/herself.
144
 Should this novel be assigned, the assigning community might be making 
the argument that this kind of freedom is desirable while in the human condition (of course, one 
could contend that an assigner might argue the opposite), which might be absolutely correct in 
our context; however, it is less plausible that an assigning community in eighteenth century 
Britain would have felt comparably comfortable with this message. As the culture changes, so 
will its art and understandings; a canon, then, and all the texts that are taught from it (or from 
other canons), will likely reflect the nature of the culture while making an argument about what 
the culture is, how it might improve itself, and what it ought to become. Correlatively, each piece 
of taught literature within a society will passively create a community of that text (or a 
community of the discussable figures and features of that text); that is, the teaching of Huck Finn 
will create a community that has read the text and has either responded or has heard others 
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respond to the text creatively, meaning that the interpretation of that text has been a part of the 
development of that person’s consciousness. 
Allegory and Mimetic Interpretation: A Mechanism for Anwendung? 
Thus far in my discussion of reference, mimesis, and the issue of canon, allegory and its 
rehabilitation in the interpretive process have not been directly addressed, but the topic is worth 
substantial attention. Given the vigorous postmodern interests of self, becoming, and interpreting 
oneself through the Other,
145
 it seems that the tendency to see, to find, or to disclose the self 
through dialogue with a constructed narrative, or understanding descriptive reference and the 
mimetic action it generates, indicates a hermeneutical goal of self-discovery (or self-creation, if 
we accept Gadamer’s vision of Fusion of horizons) located outside the other and, therefore, 
personal and artistic. If it is true that these things are exempt from empirical methodology (and 
Gadamer posits that they should be), there is no reason to preclude allegorical interpretation’s 
assistance in the interpretation of self, identity, and so on, especially as it relates to descriptive 
reference and generated mimetic action inspired by assigned texts. Furthermore, it seems that 
Walhout’s explanation of reference and mimesis are in themselves intact and coherent, but they 
are incomplete as an explanation of truth and fiction; by this, I mean that a substantial connecting 
link between descriptive reference and mimetic action is, in his analysis, nearly absent to the 
detriment of his argument. For Origen and the Stoics preceding him, this link between referential 
description and mimetic action was allegory—that which creatively relates one story of a text to 
                                                 
 
145
 Thiselton, Interpreting God, 73-78. See also, Eric Rust, Religion, Revelation, and Reason (Macon: 
Mercer University Press, 1981): 50-1. Rust describes dialogue with the Other as a quest toward self-awareness for 
the human person, and he frames this in terms of a disclosure via interpretation and dialogue. Disclosure language in 
regards to self is a bit passive for Gadamer, but the essence of dialogue will necessarily include some disclosure, 
whether that is concerning the self or the Other. It is significant that Rust engages the concept of disclosure as it 
relates to the more theological self-revelation of God, while Gadamer’s vision of Truth as revelatory of human being 
is non-theological, though the ideas are (I would argue) not unrelated. 
Weinzierl 82 
 
another story that exists in the actual and experienced world, connecting (for Origen and the 
Stoics, at least) the material and the spiritual. It seems that, in our postmodern context, allegory’s 
reinvigoration in connection to reference and mimesis ought to include (at least) a consideration 
of allegory’s usefulness to past hermeneutical giants, such as Origen or prolific Stoic 
philosopher-interpreters. It should, however, be noted that Origen (and those like him in ancient 
contexts) saw the text as a sort of authoritative riddle to be solved by a more objective interpreter 
rather than a mysterious and artistic revealer of subjective self—this is quite different from 
postmodern literary theorists and hermeneutical experts who are less likely to consider it possible 
of getting a “meaning right” at all and would likely say that such a venture, even if it were 
possible, would not be artistically valuable for a community.
146
 An actualization of Gadamer’s 
call for a postmodern reinvigoration of allegorical interpretation should not be attempted without 
due consideration of allegorical models from antiquity, when allegory was most popular, 
acceptable, and expected in interpretation; it is in Origen (and other capable allegorists) that we 
might find an acceptable historical precedent for allegorical reinvigoration when developing a 
more postmodern link between the descriptive references of our examined, assigned, and 
authoritative relevant texts and the mimesis that these texts cannot fail to generate within their 
reading communities and societies. 
First, the existence of any allegorical authority requires (in Gadamer’s mind) a tradition 
or convention upon which that allegory might ground itself. Joel Weinsheimer, in reference to 
this, writes: 
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In allegory the relation of the finite to the infinite is made possible only through 
convention, and that means not only through language but through rhetoric and dialogue. 
Allegorical conventions are not created immediately, moreover; they evolve through 
time, in dialogue with one’s forebears as well as one’s contemporaries. Tradition is the 
condition of allegorical representation; and to preserve tradition is one function of 
allegorical interpretation, of Homer or of Scripture.
147
 
Allegory and Tradition (or convention, as Weinsheimer designates) are, much in the same way as 
descriptive reference and mimesis, interdependent. The validity of an allegorical interpretation 
depends upon the conventions in which it is proposed: Origen, for instance, found himself in a 
context that overwhelmingly approved of allegory and expected it as the explanatory connecting 
link between the Scripture’s literal and spiritual meanings. Much in the same way, Stoic 
allegoresis depended on a contextual audience prepared to hear the allegoresis as valid. In this 
sense, allegory depended on the society in which it was offered. The claim here that is not as 
readily accessible is the claim that there is an interdependent relationship between allegorical 
readings and tradition. However, if the actions inspired by a text were to be questioned by any 
outsider, an allegorical reading of a communally authoritative text could conceivably justify 
whatever action had been in question (at least for the one belonging to the community of that 
text), meaning that the one who acts could explain himself/herself (and thus explain an ethical 
tradition) through allegorical interpretation. 
Whether interpreting Homer or Scripture, Weinsheimer argues that, in Gadamer’s mind, 
allegory is a source of justification within the interdependent relationship between tradition and 
action. As it is potentially useful within this sphere, its rehabilitation within this same sphere 
should not necessarily be resisted within a postmodern context—contexts in which the 
distinction between symbol and allegory (though certain relative distinctions may still exist) is 
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unclear, if not entirely uncertain: “If during the nineteenth century the symbolic was opposed to 
the allegorical as art to non-art, the absoluteness of that dichotomy has now become dubious, and 
the distinction between symbol and allegory has become relative. Such a relativization does not 
leave intact the opposition of art to non-art.”148 Art, again, involving pattern and recognition, 
does not exist as objectification without any relation to the actual world.
149
 Rather, the dramatic 
patterns within art are meant to be interpreted as objectified correlations with dramatic 
experiences within the life of an interpreter: “Art is the objectification of this purely experiential 
pattern. Hence, art is not identical to this purely experiential pattern. Rather, art objectifies the 
opening up of a new horizon, the release out of the ready-made world, then feelings of wonder 
and awe.”150 Allegoresis here is applicable to the relationship between the patterns existing 
within the artistic objectification itself and the life-patterns of the interpreter as they are revealed 
during the dynamic conversation-interpretation with the world and all its patterns. Allegory, as it 
did for the Stoics, Origen, and Gadamer, links the object and the subject, the physical and the 
spiritual, the description and the mimesis. Allegory (in its appropriate place) is therefore not in 
itself the product of introspection and reflection, but the vehicle for it; instead of being the 
meaningful solution to an interpretive problem, allegory is that which generates the meaningful 
solution, as meaning (for Gadamer) is not distinct from practical significance.
151
 
Therefore, if there is no difference between meaning and practical significance, it is true 
that the appropriate function of allegory is to artistically reveal, not only the self, but also the 
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practical significance of the fictional world, meaning the significance of the fictional world for 
the actual world of the reader. Allegory, in other words, has critical implications for self-
understanding (or self-revelation), but it also has significant practical implications within the 
sphere of social criticism, and these are equally important, if the latter is not more important, 
since its scope is far larger: 
Gadamer answers that a literary work of art ‘has in common with all other literary texts 
that it speaks to us in terms of the significance of its contents. Our understanding is not 
specifically concerned with the achievement of form that belongs to it as a work of art, 
but with what it says to us.’ The events of fiction cannot represent actual events. What 
can be represented in narrative fiction, however, is what is represented in all written 
texts—namely, the content, ‘what it says to us.’ The connection between the work of art 
and the real world, thus, is found in what is represented by means of the structure of the 
work.
152
 
According to Walhout’s interpretation of Gadamer, the events in a fictional narrative cannot 
stand for events in the actual world but, instead, are to be taken within the context of their 
fictional system. Walhout’s language here may be misleading. These systems that depend on 
referential language for their intelligibility as an organic whole (if they are to function as 
objectified revealers of personal and social truth in time, resulting in mimetic action) cannot 
stand only for one thing outside themselves, as this would limit the interpretation of the synthetic 
fictional system to a single horizon, perhaps even within the World of the text’s composition. 
This, as I have already discussed, is incompatible with Gadamer’s view of art. The relationship 
between fiction and its patterned systems of potential symbols and what these patterns refer to is 
sustained by the human interpreter, who interprets the text in light of her/his own concerns. For 
instance, if the relationship between Huck Finn and Jim is said to be commentary on the 
relationship of American people to the concepts of slavery and freedom as they permeate normal 
American life, this is only the case because the problem of slavery and freedom in America is 
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significant, and the text’s patterns have been interpreted as having something intelligent to say 
about it that will be accessible through intelligent, artistic interpretation (including the use of 
allegory).
153
 In this sense, an allegorical reading of Huck Finn would be extremely useful as a 
mechanism for social change, a methodology not uncommon to interpretation history. In 
summary, allegorical readings of texts that are relevant to particular communities have the 
potential to generate effective social criticism and action as well as reveal an individual self. 
4. The Bible, African Americans, and Allegorical Interpretation 
 I have alluded to the rigorous (allegorical) interpretation of the “Other” as creator and/or 
revealer of self, and I have argued that allegorical interpretations of the texts in which we 
encounter the “Other” can function as mechanisms that generate mimetic action in the actual, 
social Worlds in which the allegoresis occurs, a concept drawn from Stoic interpretation of 
Homer and Hesiod and the biblical hermeneutics of Origen of Alexandria. However, I have said 
little (if anything) specifically about the use and function of allegorical interpretation of 
communally-authoritative texts (especially the Bible) within communities on social margins; that 
is, if allegoresis is a mechanism that can generate social effects, it seems reasonable to examine 
the uses and functions of allegorical interpretation within communities that would be most 
interested in social change. Interpretation within these communities, if it is not pointed, 
deliberate, and clear, will certainly deviate from the normative interpretive methodology (since 
these communities’ social experience deviates from the “norm”). Even if allegory functions 
mechanically in the same way within these marginalized communities, it is probable that 
allegorical interpretations coming from these communities will seek generation of a mimetic 
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action that is distinct from the mimetic action(s) generated by the allegorical interpretation of 
other non-marginalized communities.
154
 If a postmodern rehabilitation of allegorical 
interpretation is to be in any way successful, the rehabilitators cannot fail to include the voices of 
the marginalized, the voices of those who likely need this kind of interpretation most; without the 
inclusion of these voices, an examination of the validity of postmodern allegoresis is incomplete 
and unjust. 
There likely is no better example of marginalized biblical interpretation than that of 
African Americans. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assess the philosophical status of allegory 
in the Bible’s Wirkungsgeschichte specific to the African American interpretive tradition. 
Admittedly, this tradition is broad, diverse, and impossible to engage as a synthetic whole; 
however, within the narrow scope of allegory’s function and social permissibility, it is possible 
to examine certain communities’ approaches to allegoresis of the Bible, especially regarding 
mimesis toward the goal of social criticism and change. Vincent Wimbush, commenting on the 
intersections of the Bible and African American culture in general, such as the relation of a hip 
hop artist’s life story to a biblical story, jazz-gospel music, street preachers who echo the 
language rhythm of biblical passages, etc., calls these correlations “points of cultural contact.”155 
That is, the cultural points at which the descriptive language of the Bible influences the mimetic 
actions of people in the actual world are designated in this way. It is his argument that these 
points of cultural contact developed in a manner distinct from the development of cultural 
contact points in the dominant Euro-American interpretive culture and, therefore, the interpretive 
methodology is also distinct: 
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It [the Bible] quickly came to function as a language-world, the storehouse of rhetorics, 
images, and stories that, through a complex history of engagement, helped establish 
African Americans as a circle of the biblical imaginary. It helped them imagine 
themselves as something other, in another world, different from what their immediate 
situation reflected or demanded.
156
 
Rather than interpret the Bible (communally relevant literature) toward the goal of encountering 
the Other for the sake of individual, communal, or social development (as was the case with 
Huck Finn), it seems that early African American communities of the Bible engaged the text for 
the sake of becoming or understanding themselves as Other. The goal of the identity formation, 
according to Wimbush, though the concept of Otherness is implicit in the hermeneutical 
structure, was entirely different from the goal of the normative hermeneutical structure. 
Otherness was something with which to be in dialogue for the purposes of a specific kind of 
revelation of True human being: the early African American participant in the language-world of 
the Bible participated for the sake of an identity formation that was alternative (and implicitly 
better) than the identity given to him/her by the dominant social structure. Therefore, within the 
context of postmodern allegorical rehabilitation, it is both prudent and necessary to include 
substantial consideration of the African American interpretive experience with the Bible as world 
source, as this interpretive tradition (one temporally closer to our own than Origen) reflects an 
experience in which the function of allegory was distinct from the normative, European 
interpretive tradition. 
Interpretive Methodological Difference: Imagination, Community, and Society 
To be enslaved meant, among a plethora of other things, to be cut off from one’s culture 
of origin, one’s language, and one’s religion—in essence, the slave’s way of being human was 
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taken; therefore, engagement with a text capable of speaking to the foundational feeling of 
Otherness and exile was a resource and activity of immeasurable value,
157
 and the engagement of 
the Bible was done in such a way that it ran counter to popular European interpretations 
(interpretations that often aided the European understanding of Africans as inferior).
158
 These 
counter-interpretations often saw the God of the Bible as a power fighting on behalf of the 
oppressed even in times without war, a God who both affirms and embodies the subjective 
struggle of the oppressed racial-collective of individual (holy) selves, honoring (or even joining) 
the struggle of these poor and oppressed (economically and otherwise) by offering those who 
struggle the realization of their goal of liberation in the actual world.
159
 These attributes and 
activities of this God interpreted from the Bible do not seem identical with those of the God 
Origen interpreted from the Bible, and many scholars are in agreement that both the interpretive 
methodology and interpretive goals of African Americans in the pre-Civil War United States 
were different from those of interpreters of European ancestry.
160
 Hopkins notes that this early 
interpretive difference between African American and European American hermeneutics (with 
its immediate cause perhaps being class or some other sociological power) can essentially be 
broken down into two conflicting versions of Protestantism, accusing the European version of 
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irony, if not hypocrisy.
161
 It is indeed ironic that both of these interpretive communities reach 
their nearly opposite conclusions using the same authoritative text, though opposing and 
contradictory interpretations of the same piece of literature are hardly rare within interpretive 
traditions, and as the two interpretive communities are reading for entirely different goals, it is 
hardly shocking that they reach conclusions in tension with one another. 
Needless to say, this dichotomy is obvious. On the one hand (and very generally 
speaking), a version of Protestant Christianity baptizes Africans and African Americans into 
chattel slavery. On the other hand (again, very generally), a second version proclaims liberation 
for the oppressed and knowledge of a God who fights alongside those who struggle for the 
realization of this goal. Hopkins is astute in his observation and interpretation, but it seems that 
the validity of his accusation of hypocrisy on the part of the European American biblical 
interpreters rests on the assumption that these interpreters understood their message to be one 
that was universally liberating in all metaphysical senses, which is debatable, at best. In fact, 
even from Hopkins’ own evidence,162 many of these interpreters seem to have understood their 
brutal goal quite clearly as one without a universally liberating component (even if contemporary 
audiences find this archaic conclusion laughable). Either way, even though there is certainly a 
great deal of difference between these conclusions, Hopkins’ analysis is missing something 
crucial. It seems that each of these categorically-generalized, early American interpretive 
traditions is substantially in relationship to the hermeneutical methodology of both Gadamer and 
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Origen of Alexandria (either for good or ill), an observation that could have lent itself to 
Hopkins’ analysis of these two opposing interpretive camps. 
African American Biblical Interpretation and Gadamer’s Distinct Vision of Truth 
First, and in relation to Gadamer, each interpretive community interprets its shared 
authoritative text, not from a place of objectivity, but always from the interpretive community’s 
own social situation and in light of its own concerns.
163
 To use a tangentially-related illustration, 
if a nineteenth century person interpreting Huck Finn for the purposes of the perpetuation of 
slavery (though the book was published long after abolition) were to assert that Huck’s 
leadership skills on the raft, Jim’s susceptibility to Huck’s trickery, and the Southern direction of 
their journey on the Mississippi river were all instances of textual evidence going to support the 
assertion that African Americans (Jim) are inferior to European Americans (Huck), this would be 
an assertion made in light of the interpreter’s interest in the perpetuation of slavery. The 
descriptive references within the text have been applied to their interpreted “appropriate” 
counterparts in the actual world and the social exhortation toward mimesis is given. Again, if a 
nineteenth century interpreter had wished to argue the opposite, s/he could find references and 
apply them accordingly, but any religious, legal, political, or other communal/social assertion 
made will be made with the interest of supporting the ideology of the interpretive community.  
More broadly (and speaking more to Gadamer’s vision of allegory in the case of 
Hopkins’ two categories of Protestant interpretation), both interpretive communities (pro and 
anti-slavery) are using the Bible as the text through which the question of slavery might find its 
answer, and, of the several varieties of European American interpretations and applications of 
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the Bible that are now available to us, few of them seem to have fought actively against slavery 
on the basis on (what Hopkins calls) “religious grounds,”164 presumably meaning dogmatic 
reasons. These “religious grounds” and any dogmatic presuppositions or conclusions made by 
the European American interpretive community while in conversation with their authoritative 
text are hardly pithy assertions based on a few scarcely recollected aphorisms. Rather, they are 
the rigorously-acquired conclusions of an interpretive community that has made an attempt at 
understanding themselves comprehensively, communally, and synthetically within their own 
society and within dialogue with the text they hold as authoritative for the society in which they 
exist. Their conclusions, no matter how obscene contemporary audiences find them, were 
reached through a similar methodology as I have described above—the references in the Bible 
(to slaves and masters, for instance) were taken as symbols, standing for those slaves and masters 
in the actual world.
165
 The metaphysical understanding of the social world through the eyes of 
the European American in dialogue with the Bible and the question of slavery gave primacy to 
the concept of authority, and all the arguments made in the support of slavery from this 
interpretive community will therefore give primary attention to the appropriate role of authority 
within a society informed by the culturally relevant text.
166
 The entire social paradigm, therefore, 
within the imagination of the slaveholder (a person with authority), was seen through the social 
lens of authority, the lens that best aided those in authority to understand the text and their 
society in light of their problems and concerns. 
                                                 
164
 Hopkins, Down, Up, and Over, 34-5. Hopkins’ research indicates three normative European American 
interpretive positions, including those that supported slavery outright and openly, those that were silent on the issue 
and therefore supportive of slavery, and what he calls the “centrist” position, which amounts to a theological and 
sociological “it depends,” which he argues was perhaps the most popular among slaveholders, as its subtleties 
actually granted them the most authority. 
165
 Ibid, 51-94. 
 
166
 Ibid, 30-5. Hopkins’ supplies a list of classifications of European American interpretations and 
applications of the Bible onto the social and moral problem of slavery for a society that (in whatever regard) held the 
Bible to be somehow authoritative. 
Weinzierl 93 
 
Just as the slave masters understood society through the metaphysics of authority while in 
conversation with their authoritative texts, early African American interpreters saw things in 
quite another fashion, as Hopkins comments: 
[E]nslaved African Americans used the space and time from sundown to sunup to co-
constitute themselves with divine intent into their own racial religious formation. They 
hoped for and pursued a liberated humanity. They forged themselves as a new African 
American people of faith embodied in an everyday practical knowledge anchored in their 
existential encounter with the Spirit of freedom and in their own hermeneutical reading of 
the biblical text. In a word, the liberating Spirit met them and worked with them both in 
material experience and in textual deciphering.
167
 
This action (from sundown to sunup) correctly assumes that African Americans were occupied 
between sunup and sundown with the identities assigned them by their European American 
oppressors. The nighttime, then, according to Hopkins, is a time in which African American 
slaves were able to create identities for themselves apart from those assigned them by those in 
authority, and these identities were received from (or co-constituted with, to use Hopkins’ 
vocabulary) the Spirit of freedom, or the Spirit of liberation, as it is seen elsewhere—that is, 
God. Hoping and longing first for a liberated humanity (certainly including themselves, if not 
first including themselves), it seems that enslaved African Americans, at least according to 
Hopkins’ argument, categories, and data, also interpreted the Bible in light of their own concerns 
and, therefore, they gave metaphysical primacy to the concept of liberation from oppression: 
understandably, the most immediate concern available. 
 This metaphysical primacy of liberation or emancipation in regard to theological inquiry 
is a concept coming out of the African American slave experience, but it has had lasting 
theological, social, and moral effect into the present. Through asking questions concerning the 
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activity of God in the actual world, Hopkins argues that enslaved African Americans came up 
with a radically different answer than European Americans, just as contemporary African 
American theology is particularly unique: 
In contrast and in response [to a locking out of black humanity from resources], God 
works with the oppressed black community to co-constitute a new liberated, spiritual and 
material humanity. God is the Spirit of freedom for us…The fundamental act of God…is 
earthy emancipation for those in bondage, both spiritual and material, and this act 
operates in a co-constitutive fashion. The poor and brokenhearted are co-agents with 
divine intent to fashion a new emancipated human self. In a word, God works with us 
through the act of freedom as we constitute ourselves from oppression to a full reality of 
the highest potential of a liberated humanity. God liberates us totally and holistically.
168
 
The religious thought of Hopkins’ “slave religion” is argued to be intimately connected even to 
contemporary African American theology, and Hopkins does make his point well, and a reading 
of his argument through Gadamer’s hermeneutics is quite productive; in fact, if Gadamer is 
correct, there should be no surprise that there is a relationship between slave religion and African 
American theology, especially if the interpretations are attempted using similar methodology, 
since access to non-falsifiable Truth that is revelatory of human being is accomplished (in 
Gadamer’s view) within a Tradition that grants the readings authority. Hopkins’ argument here is 
that God is identical with the “Spirit of freedom” and that the formation of a person or 
community’s identity as a liberated individual is accomplished by that person and his/her 
dialogue with the “Spirit of freedom” (something I would prefer to call the Will to freedom, 
since this seems clearer). Hopkins’ implication here is that this version of reading the Bible in 
such a way that total emancipation from oppression and the “full reality of the highest potential 
of a liberated humanity” is achieved is a hermeneutical methodology unique to African 
Americans coming out of the slave experience in America, and (broadly speaking) he is correct; 
however, this implication has its limits. Though the details of the experience and the 
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corresponding terminology (slavery, liberation, etc.) are, of course, unique to the African 
American experience, there is a great deal of similarity between this methodology and that of the 
European American slave masters! The only substantive difference, it would seem, is the 
metaphysical primacy given to liberation in the African American interpretive community and 
the primacy of authority in the European American interpretive community. Each community is 
interpreting in light of its own social concerns, which is why I argue that a closer reading of this 
through Gadamer is indeed quite productive, especially in light of his vision of what Truth is. If 
human Truth is that which is discovered during an encounter with the “Other” that is revelatory 
of human being,
169
 it seems as if the European American interpretive metaphysic (at least as it is 
presented by Hopkins), giving prime place to authority, concerns itself first and foremost with 
the proper place of authority as it is installed by God who is not manipulated by human 
imagination or authority. This is not so much revelatory of human being as it is revelatory of the 
European idea of social authority and its relationship to God. Conversely, it seems that the 
African American interpretive metaphysic (again, at least presented by Hopkins), concentrating 
on the holistic liberation of the human person, is almost exactly in line with Gadamer’s vision of 
hermeneutical understanding as the disclosure of Truth. It is an active dialogue with a co-creator, 
other than the self, that reconstitutes the self and reassigns identity in an ongoing interpretive 
process. Therefore, the actual substantive difference between Hopkins’ categories of European 
and African American interpretive communities when they are read through Gadamer is not their 
(lack of) brilliance in communicating American ideology of freedom and individual choice 
within a free market, but one’s capacity to reveal human Truth and the other’s lack of revelatory 
capacity on that level. This seems an unjustified and narrow-visioned generalization of European 
thought, as evidenced by my earlier discussion of Gadamer, but (given Hopkins’ evidence) this is 
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a fair characterization of some popular opinions among Europeans and European Americans. 
Moreover, given his evidence, this is an excellent characterization of African American biblical 
hermeneutics. Regardless of nineteenth century European popular theology, the reading of 
African American theology and biblical interpretation through the hermeneutical philosophy of 
Gadamer is likely a productive and worthwhile endeavor. 
The Rehabilitation of Allegory and African American Interpretation 
Second, and in relation to Origen, these two interpretive philosophies, coming from two 
very distinct interpretive communities, require, not only understanding of the text with which 
they are engaged, but the application process of that text onto the community or society for 
which it is relevant and the interpretive methodology appropriate in reaching these conclusions 
meant for communal or social application through exhortation. The process is not one of relating 
a single proposition or maxim to a two-dimensional community or society, but a process of 
relating an immensely complex textual reality to an equally complex social fabric that is broad, 
dynamic, and changing. The social systems (and the texts to be applied to them) are experienced 
realities, stories, and relationships. These synthetic and comprehensive social systems (when 
understood in dialogue with a text) cannot be understood by the participant apart from the very 
basic interpretive tool of descriptive reference and mimetic action; however, when these issues 
are societal in scope (and not individual persons, snakes, rivers, etc.), it becomes more difficult 
to determine which referent in the moving text stands for which object or idea in the moving 
world without the interpretive link of allegory. That is, references and their mimetic correlations 
are best understood within the textual and/or societal systems in which they appear, just as 
allegories are best understood within their own allegorical systems in making the interpretive 
leap from the abstract textual to the concrete personal. This, of course, goes far beyond the 
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simpler and muted version of understanding a single story in the communally-relevant text or 
portion of a popular book as an allegory, and it is likely better applied to an understanding of the 
entire metanarrative of the collective textual whole as meaningfully connected (through symbol 
and reasonable synthetic relationships) to the actual world of human experience as it is 
experienced by human persons over time.
170
 
In the case of contemporary African American biblical interpretation, few worthwhile 
interpretations ignore the social position of the interpreter or interpreting community; in fact, 
according to Thomas Hoyt, Jr., any African American biblical interpretation that does justice to 
the categorization of “African American” will give appropriate consideration to the experience of 
the African American community and will consider that communal experience and its social 
effect as formative and authoritative in its engagement with the Bible and the social/communal 
applications that the interpretation produces.
171
 Hoyt, commenting on African American 
interpretation in general (as it stands in comparison to European interpretation in general), 
asserts: 
It is almost axiomatic that in interpreting Scripture those who are marginalized and those 
who have more of a stake in the status quo would bring a different set of questions to the 
text...For blacks, Jesus is human and identifies with the poor by suffering on their 
behalf...This Jesus is presently in solidarity with those seeking to eradicate injustices and 
gives courage and motivation…By contrast, whites tend to stress the resurrection as the 
beginning of a triumphalist church tradition that protects the status quo.
172
 
This contrast, even if it seems to be a bit of an unfair and generalized characterization of 
European-informed Christianity, represents African American readings of Scripture and the 
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actual experienced world as read through the lens of the Jesus of the Bible, and it does so for the 
sake of interpreting Jesus’ relationship to experienced liberation from an oppressive status quo. 
In other words, Hopkins is arguing that, within the African American community, biblical 
Christology functions socially in a way that expresses solidarity with those suffering injustices in 
the world and in need of liberation and freedom (what Hopkins argues to be God’s primary 
action in the world). This African American methodological relationship between text and 
society (both of which are read in light of the reader’s location and concerns) is paradigmatically 
similar to the allegorical methodology of Origen, who, developing a metaphysical system based 
on his community’s sacred text, interprets both the world and the text primarily through the lens 
of Jesus’ salvific effect. Put differently, the tendency of African American biblical interpreters to 
read the text in a socio-political, economic manner reflective of their own historically 
conditioned self-understanding (informed by community) is mirrored by their tendency to apply 
these readings to their interpretive communities in a socially critical way that is paradigmatically 
similar to the communal and social applications made by Origen.
173
 Hopkins explains: 
When the oppressed achieve a measure of freedom found in the newly co-constituted self 
accompanied by the Spirit with us, they enunciate very clearly, through resilient rituals, 
the dynamic interplay between the fruit of salvation and liberation. Jesus brings salvation 
along with earthly freedom. An evangelical spirit-filled soul parallels and dovetails with a 
spirit-induced social transformation. The fuller salvation and liberation manifest together, 
the fuller the presence of Jesus with us.
174
 
By “salvation and liberation,” Hopkins means the activity of the spirit of Jesus both within a 
person’s being and within a person’s social World, respectively. One might characterize them as 
the centripetal and centrifugal effects of the spirit of Jesus. Compare this with the personal 
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exhortation of Origen for his congregation to imitate Lazarus awakening following his 
resuscitation, or with Origen’s encouragement of his congregation to be a part of the saving work 
of God in the social world, just as each part of the Church is as a board or plank in Noah’s ark. 
Hopkins’ vocabulary distinguishes between a personal and individual salvation and a more social 
liberation, whereas Origen (reading the Bible and society Soteriologically) might include both of 
these divine actions within his vision of salvation. The divine action of salvation in the thought 
processes of Origen and African American biblical interpreters includes both individual and 
social components, though this is not the only similarity, as African American interpretations are 
quick to include (and even celebrate) allegorical readings and identifications with the biblical 
text, considering this a perfectly acceptable and expected way in which to see a community’s 
experience mirrored in that community’s sacred text, and the conversation between the two 
stories will inform opinions and readings of both, enriching and revealing Truth about being 
human in a suffering community while in relationship with a sacred, communally relevant text. 
This, it seems, is the kind of allegorical interpretation that Gadamer sees as worthy of a 
contemporary revaluation, an allegory that rationally and meaningfully connects the textual 
World to the World of the reader in a way that informs both Worlds without compromising the 
integrity of either, a relationship best exemplified by Hopkins’ explication of an African 
American spiritual that is theologically loaded: 
  My God is a rock in a weary land 
  shelter in a time of storm… 
 Stop let me tell you ‘bout the Chapter One 
  When the Lord God’s work has jus’ begun 
 Stop and let me tell ‘bout the Chapter Two 
  When the Lord God’s written his Bible through 
 Stop and let me tell you ‘bout the Chapter Three 
  When the Lord God died on Calvary… 
 Stop and let me tell you ‘bout the Chapter Four 
  Lord God visit ‘mong the po’ 
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 Stop and let me tell you ‘bout Chapter Five 
  Lord God brought the dead alive 
 Stop and let me tell you ‘bout the Chapter Six 
  He went in Jerusalem and healed the sick… 
 Stop and let me till you ‘bout Chapter Seven 
  Died and risen and went to Heaven 
 Stop and let me tell you ‘bout Chapter Eight 
  John see Him standin’ at the Golden Gate 
 Stop and let me tell you ‘bout Chapter Nine 
  Lord God turned the water into wine 
 Stop and let me tell you ‘bout the Chapter Ten 
  John says He’s comin’ in the world again.175 
 
Hopkins observes that this spiritual, essentially a synthetic, biblical theology, functions as a way 
African Americans understood the Bible primarily through the lens of their own experience, 
evidenced by the beginning, when God is equated with a rock in a weary land, but it is 
secondarily (or, I would argue, just as importantly) a way that the African American community 
of this song has theologized its own experience as a people enduring suffering at the hands of an 
“Other.” According to Hopkins, every line of the song, though obviously about the Bible or some 
related theological topic, does not stop at a detailed abstraction of some imagined theological 
world; rather, the writers and singers have also been careful in choosing these particular 
abstractions in order to reflect some key aspect of the African American personal experience, 
with textual abstractions (either actual characters or anthropomorphized events) in the song 
taking on roles correspondent to actual persons and generalized social positions in the actual 
world of the African American experience, all understood from within the event-context of 
persecution, oppression, and slavery.
176
 By understanding their own experience as a synthetic 
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whole that stands in relation to another synthetic story, the African American audiences that 
engaged in spirituals such as these employed the philosophical tool of interpretive allegory, not 
just on the Bible, but on their own concrete lives as they stood in relation to textual abstractions 
represented in their communally-relevant and authoritative text, the Bible. 
 It is for this reason that the methodology of African American allegorical communities 
such as those who employed spirituals like the one above is similar to the methodology of 
Origen. The very same interpretive fulcrums that were prevalent in Origen’s interpretation (of 
Noah’s ark, for example) are utilized here in the African American theology represented in this 
spiritual. Origen is careful to relate the biblical text to his congregation by means of identity 
assignment and event correlation; if we recall, Origen was quite thorough in his assignment of 
identity from abstract textual referents onto their mimetic counterparts in the actual, concrete 
world of his experience.
177
 Planks become teachers in the Church, animals on the varying levels 
of the ark become those Christians who, having been brought into the Church, are in need of 
protection by the planks, the storm and swells outside the ark become the attacks from those 
outside the Church seeking to destroy it, and (perhaps most importantly) Noah becomes Jesus, 
who has made plans assuring the integrity of the ark/Church. In the African American spiritual 
above, the “poor” whom Jesus visits, for whom he administers spiritual care, and in whose 
interest he has provided hope, are identified quite explicitly with the African American 
community in the actual world. The abstract idea, the text referent of “poor,” which is plentiful 
across the entire Bible, is assigned a very personal and concrete mimetic correlation: the African 
American community that experiences oppression and persecution from those who are in 
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positions of power or wealth. Again, Jesus’ textual death and resurrection signify a victory over 
“the many layered masks of evil”178 in the actual world, presumably assigned to those social 
forces in privilege that oppress communities and deny equality, liberation, regeneration, and 
acknowledgement of full humanity among the people. Although the identity assignments made 
here are entirely different from those identity assignments made by Origen (which is 
understandable, given the different Worlds), the methodology with respect to identity assignment 
is quite similar, if not identical. In both cases, the interpreting community synthetically assigns 
identities to personalities within societies, based on the characters or anthropomorphized things 
found in the text: they both use the Bible in the construction of a synthetic metaphysical system 
representative of their perception of (and experience with) reality.
179
 
 Furthermore, these allegorical interpretations are both conditioned by the events in the 
lives of the interpreters and/or assigning communities that they find to be absolutely primary. 
However, there is one glaring difference: while Origen interprets the Noah story as a single (yet 
complex) event that is related allegorically to a single concrete reality, it seems that the example 
of the African American spiritual considers the communal-social predicament to be, not just a 
single event reducible to “oppression,” “liberation,” or some other abstraction. Rather, it is best 
expressed as a variety of inter-weaving events that present themselves to the individual and 
community as a great many events that cannot be reduced, for if they were, the result would do a 
great injustice to the experience of the community as rich, tragic, desperate, hopeful, and many 
other abstract, yet accurate, terms. Even so, the African American community that employs 
spirituals such as these clearly considers the experience of their community as primary in 
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interpretation of sacred text, just as Origen considered it as such. This shared methodology, as it 
will take both identity and event into consideration, has a very great potential for utilization in 
the revelation of what it means to be human within a given context. That is, both identity and 
life-events are of immense importance to human beings, and this methodology is particularly 
useful in revealing what these things are, and therefore it is valuable, especially if we consider 
that Gadamer equates Truth with that which is revelatory of human being. 
Prescriptive Allegory and African American Social Critique 
 Specifically regarding Marxist interpretation of texts and social history, and organizing 
his approach to a prescriptive allegorical reading of a text into succinct horizons of prescriptive 
interpretation, Vincent Leitch argues: 
The result is that the second horizon [text as utterance of antagonistic dialogue] of 
interpretation is allegorical in a highly special, prescriptive sense. Analogously, the 
historical “intertextuality” of the artwork “must” “always” be rewritten in terms of the 
Marxian theory of successive and overlapping modes of production, rendering the third 
horizon of interpretation [the study of the text as conjecture and projection of history] an 
operation of equally prescriptive allegorizing.
180
 
The relationship between text and society here is intentionally described as prescriptive, partially 
because this is within the context of Marxism and Marxist interpretation, but the methodology, 
especially the categorization of prescriptive allegory as especially manifest in the second and 
third components of three distinct horizons of interpretation also characterizes the African 
American interaction with the Bible quite well. That is to say, Leitch is only utilizing Marxism as 
a catalyst through which his audience might understand his greater point: that reading anything at 
all (assuming the reader has any social concern at all) can be understood as something that he 
calls “allegorical rewriting.” The three horizons of interpretation and understanding are, he 
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explains: 1) the text is primarily and foundationally understood as a symbolic act that “offers 
imaginary resolutions of real sociopolitical contradictions.”181 It is first a vessel reflecting social 
anxieties and crises at the reader in a world consisting purely of thought, a world other than the 
actual world. 2) “The text is understood as utterance of antagonistic dialogue.”182 That is, the text 
is understood secondarily as an active dialogue partner through which interpretations of the 
actual world might be achieved. 3) The third horizon characterizes the text as a “specific 
conjuncture that recalls and projects all the conflicting historical modes of production.”183 Put 
differently, the third horizon of interpretation is that which understands the text as an affair that 
collects and bears history into the present as an interpreted and informative whole. 
One of Leitch’s arguments is simply that the second and third of these horizons, requiring 
connection between the imagined World of the text and the actual, social World of the individual 
interpreter, requires prescriptive allegory in the making of this interpretive leap. If this is the 
case, and (if interpretation is understood as more than simply a knowledge of the text’s 
descriptive reference and inclusive of a mimetic action) it seems to be, it seems that a reading of 
African American biblical criticism using these three horizons of “allegorical rewriting” would 
be very productive. 
In illustration of this, Hopkins offers an account of an African American former slave 
who interprets the Bible in light of the African American community’s concerns as a people 
having been drawn out of Africa (here, assumedly, identified as the more specific Ethiopia): 
‘He says that Ethiopia shall yet stretch forth her hand and all nations shall bow unto her. I 
long to see the day that the Ethiopians shall all bow unto God as the One that we should 
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all bow unto, for it is to Him that we all owe our homage and to be very grateful to Him 
for our deliverance as a race. If we should fail to give him the honor due there would a 
curse come to us as a race, for we remember those of olden times were of the same 
descent of our people, and some of those that God honored most were of the Ethiopians, 
such as the Unica and Philop [sic], and even Moses, the law-giver, was of the same 
seed.’184 
This very early example of a former slave’s interpretation of Psalm 68 is only secondarily 
interesting in this context because of the theological content; it is primarily interesting because of 
the “allegorical rewriting,” as Leitch would characterize it, coming through in the interpretation 
and application given to the listening audience. The Bible, to this former slave, has stretched 
beyond the first horizon of simple symbolic gesture in a barely connected textual world and has, 
instead, become an instrument by which connections between the textual world of descriptive 
reference and the actual world of mimetic action have been drawn allegorically and quite starkly. 
The exhortation that is most ominous, of course, is the admonition against failing to give God 
honor as a racial collective, an activity meant to be carried out in the actual World but based on 
evidence rooted in the World of the text. The connection between the two Worlds is more than 
connecting two dots; rather, it is a process of intimately connecting the social stories of two 
peoples as they experience the world, and the connection is, thus, an allegorical one. The writer, 
moreover, connects his people in the actual world to the textual Ethiopians, not just because of 
their common devotion to the same God, but also because of a shared racial ancestry; the points 
of social anxiety (correspondent to the second interpretive horizon) to which they are 
allegorically connected consist almost entirely in racial wellbeing as the result of submission and 
due homage to God. Beyond this, the writer’s history (and the history of his/her people) is bound 
up and understood/informed through the collected and very present history of the textual 
Ethiopians, thus fulfilling the third horizon. 
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 As further illustration, Vincent Wimbush discusses the African American fascination 
with certain biblical passages that have been of key interest in history: 
The preoccupation of many African American orators with the theme of Christian radical 
inclusion can be seen most strikingly in the engagement of one of the New Testament 
passages they found resonant and compelling. The key passage to Christian moral and 
social ethical thinking and practice was “There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither 
slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus.” 
…This passage and other passages were used to level prophetic judgment against a 
society that thought of itself as biblical in its foundation and ethic.
185
 
The interpretive reality here seems to be methodologically similar, though not identical, to that of 
the former slave (though, admittedly, this is not a single instance but the description of a broad 
and general trend among African Americans and their interaction with this and other key 
passages). The key passage in question is argued to be the foundation of nineteenth century 
(European American) Christian ethics. Wimbush also asserts that this is also the foundational 
verse for African American Christian ethics in the nineteenth century, but it is so as a response 
and corrective to the use (or misuse) of this verse by the oppressive society. The interpretation of 
the passage is still allegorical, since the interpretation of the verse results in the relation of 
symbolic characters described in the text (Jews, Greeks, etc.) and mimetically assigns these 
identities to figures in the actual world; thereafter, the resulting action would include a way of 
being human that was (before the application of the text) unknown or unreachable. What is also 
unique about the African American interaction with this passage is the manner in which it is 
engaged with a vision toward social critique and critique of the misuse of this very passage. The 
second and third interpretive horizons are satisfied by African American sociopolitical 
dissatisfaction as it is understood through this verse and by the allegorical application of this 
verse onto society in a corrective and distinctly African American sense. The utilization of 
allegory in the African American community thus exists to express both communal solidarity 
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and a will toward social critique. This methodology is of very great value, especially for the 
oppressed, and it should be rehabilitated and re-appropriated wherever possible, as it is 
especially useful in revealing human being in community and in working toward the liberation of 
persons in societies that are oppressive. 
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Conclusion 
 It has been a focus of this essay to trace, not only the connections and similarities 
between Gadamer, Origen, African American theology, and the relationship between fiction and 
ethics, but also to show how these topics thematically permeate one another. The primary 
intention of this essay, however, has been to review and analyze Gadamer’s notion that 
allegorical interpretation of artwork has been undervalued for too long and that, within 
postmodern contexts, certain forms of allegorical interpretation deserve revaluation and 
rehabilitation. This newly revitalized allegorical interpretation, far from being dryly dogmatic, 
will assist the reader or interpreter in bridging the interpretive gap between the descriptive 
reference of the textual world and the actual world of human experience and can serve as a 
socially and personally liberating interpretive tool connecting the centripetal and centrifugal 
functions of a communally relevant text, between the text references and the mimetic actions. 
 The process of discovering Truth, that which reveals human being through the personal 
and active interpretation of the Other (as Gadamer defines it), as in the case of the grieving child, 
might be simple and have a clear and obvious connection to one’s experience. The connection 
might be as simple as understanding yourself and your community as racially connected to an 
obscure people group that is represented in the text. On the other hand, arriving at a meaningful 
allegory can easily be complicated and troubling. Either way, interpretive allegory has the 
capacity to reveal Truth through meaningful and rational contemplation and dialogue with that 
which is Other, through conversation with that which (even while being Other) has the capacity 
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to inform the life of the interpreter. Far from necessarily being the dryly rational and overly 
dogmatic tool by which an authority proselytizes an audience into humble submission, the 
revaluation of allegory in the postmodern world is in reference to the personal and necessary 
dialogical tool in the discourse between interpreter and the text. I have attempted to show that 
allegory, far from being non-artistic, is necessary in the interpretive process and should be 
revalued as a tool through which human beings come to know Truth about themselves, their 
community, their society, and how they might critique any of these. Allegory in its postmodern 
rehabilitation (if that is to take place) unites the text World and actual World; it is a crucial 
philosophical tool of the interpreter who seeks to connect the imagined World of the text to the 
actual World that we inhabit—the invaluable tool that bridges the gap between reference and 
mimesis, between the centripetal and centrifugal, between a thought and an action. 
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